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Abstract
The literature on adverse selection has until recently concentrated on the 
case where the agent’s outside option is type-independent, implying that all 
types of agent receive the same payoff should no trade occur with the prin­
cipal. Unfortunately, this assumption is not innocuous. If it is relaxed, 
the properties of the optimal contract can change dramatically. This thesis 
characterizes the impact of type-dependent outside options in three differ­
ent settings. First, we explore the notion that a worker’s prospects in the 
labour market may be influenced by his employment history. Under these 
circumstances, employers may incentivise their employees by randomizing 
over the probability with which current employees are retained. We identify 
a set of sufficient conditions for this to be the case in a two-period employ­
ment relationship, where the employee’s ability is private information and 
both parties are risk-neutral. Although randomization is seldom observed in 
the real world, our results suggest that employers may optimally introduce 
some ambiguity over the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to be 
retained.
Second, we study competition in price-quality menus within the context 
of an horizontally differentiated duopoly, where each firm also operates in 
a local, monopolistic market. It is assumed that the consumer’s (unobserv­
able) valuation for quality is determined by the nature of his preferences over 
horizontal (or brand) product characteristics. We find that, if competition 
between the two firms is sufficiently fierce: (1) the equilibrium quality sched­
ule exhibits bunching and (2) the equilibrium contract features overprovision 
of quality for sufficiently low types. Thus, with respect to the monopoly set­
ting, competition may introduce new types of distortions, namely upward 
distortions.
Third, we analyze the conflict of interests that arises between employ­
ers and employees with respect to the adoptiom of innovations that change 
the nature of the skills relevant for production. If an employer decides to 
adopt a new technology, he will also replace his specialist workforce. Thus, 
although a current employee has access to superior information concerning 
the efficiency of the new technology, he also has an incentive to misreport 
it. We show that if (1) the employee’s expected utility from alternative em­
ployment is lower when the new technology is superior and (2) the employer 
cannot commit to retain the employee if the new technology is adopted, no 
renegotiation-proof contract exists, which induces the employee to truth­
fully reveal his information. In the special case where the employee can 
ex-ante commit to make his information publicly avalaible (commitment to 
transparency), access to external sources of information can result in the 
employer’s choice of technology being less efficient than otherwise.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
The theory of general equilibrium is universally regarded as the one of the major achieve­
ments of economics. According to this theory, the economy is composed of a continuum 
of agents who interact through the price system. Agents consider themselves too small 
to influence the equilibrium prices, and therefore behave as price-takers. The power of 
the theory of general equilibrium resides in the fact that it generalizes Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” to a wide variety of settings1; so long as the appropriate market can 
be set up, market forces are sufficient to ensure efficiency. This also applies to situations 
where uncertainty is present, provided that information is symmetric among economic 
agents.
In the presence of asymmetric information, however, the theory of general equilib­
rium loses power. This was first highlighted by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), and 
Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976). These authors showed that when information is asym­
metrically distributed among agents, a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist, or may 
exist but not be Pareto efficient. Following this discovery, several economists decided to 
turn away from general equilibrium models, and instead concentrate on the problem of 
exchange under asymmetric information in the simplest possible setting, i.e. between a 
small number of traders. Soon it became clear that in order to gain a better insight into 
this type of interaction, new tools had to be adopted: an agent who possesses private
1For a recent textbook exposition of the theory of general equilibrium, see Mas-Colell, Whinston 
and Green (1995).
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information is bound to behave strategically. The methodology of game theory was 
adopted to model such strategic interactions. Contract theory was born.
Contract theory utilizes game theoretical concepts to model the strategic interactions 
among a small group of economic agents, within a partial equilibrium context. The 
paradigm most commonly employed for this purpose is the principal-agent model. In this 
model, there are two economic agents: the informed party, or agent, whose information 
is relevant for the common welfare, and the uninformed party, called the principal. 
Bargaining over the terms of trade takes a very simple form: the principal possesses all 
the bargaining power. He proposes a “take it or leave it” contract2 specifying the terms 
of trade to the agent, who may accept or reject the offer, but may not propose another 
contract.
This thesis concentrates on the class of principal-agent models that study situations 
where the agent’s private information concerns his characteristics, or type (adverse 
selection models). The literature on adverse selection has until recently concentrated 
on the case where all types of agent receive the same payoff should no trade occur 
with the principal; in other words, the agent’s outside option is type-independent. This 
simplifying assumption has allowed theorists to make remarkably robust predictions: 
with respect to the full-information, efficient outcome, the optimal contract prescribes 
no distortions for the “best” type agent, and downward distortions for all other types (as 
in Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Moreover, if the agent’s type distribution satisfies a common 
monotone hazard property, the optimal menu of contracts involves full separation of 
types.
Unfortunately, the assumption of type-independent outside options is often not re­
alistic; whenever trading with the principal implies some foregone opportunity for the 
agent (arising for instance by the possibility of trading with other principals), it is nat­
ural to expect that the opportunity cost incurred when trading with the principal should 
vary with the agent’s type. Even more importantly, the assumption of type-independent 
outside options is not innocuous. If this assumption is relaxed, the properties of the
2 Implicitly, it is assumed that contracts can be enforced by courts of law, that would impose (arbi­
trarily large) penalties if one of the contractual partners adopts a behaviour that deviates from the one 
specified in the contract.
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equilibrium contract can change dramatically. This was first highlighted by Lewis and 
Sappington (1989), within the context of the regulation of a public firm. They showed 
that if the firm’s (unobservable) marginal cost is inversely correlated with its fixed cost, 
the firm faces countervailing incentives : on one hand, it would like to quote a high 
marginal cost, in order to set a high price; on the other hand, it would like to quote high 
fixed costs (and a low marginal cost), in order to receive a higher refund. The presence 
of these countervailing incentives implies that bunching and overprovision3 feature in 
the optimal incentive contract.
A full characterization of the adverse selection problem in the presence of type- 
dependent outside options can be found in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and 
Jullien (2000). These authors show that, at equilibrium, pooling or separation, upward, 
downward or no distortions may all emerge, depending on the shape of the agent’s 
outside option. The general lesson to be learned is that whenever trading with the 
principal implies some foregone opportunity for the agent: (1) this is likely to matter 
and (2) no general predictions can be made concerning the properties of the equilibrium 
contract. This suggests that the investigation into the impact of type-dependent outside 
options in agency settings should be conducted at a more specific level. By reducing 
the level of generality, we may be able to draw more detailed conclusions.
This thesis characterizes the impact of the presence of type-dependent outside op­
tions in three separate settings. The second chapter explores the notion that a worker’s 
prospects in the labor market may be influenced by his employment history. Dismissal 
from a previous job, for example, may send a negative signal concerning the worker’s 
ability, thereby narrowing his prospects. Alternatively, the fact that a worker has accu­
mulated previous work experience may make him more valuable in the eyes of potential 
employers. In a two-period model, this implies that the agent’s (type-dependent) out­
side option before he contracts with the principal differs from his outside option after 
one period of employment. We find that if the difference between the agent’s ex-ante
3 Although Lewis and Sappington do not explicitly consider the case where the agent has type- 
dependent outside options, it is clear that their analysis can be readily applied to the situation where 
the agent’s outside option is type-dependent, and inversely related to the agent’s type. This can be seen 
by noticing that the agent’s net utility (i.e. his gross utility minus his outside option) when interacting 
with the principal has the same form as the regulated firm’s profit in the Lewis and Sappington’s 
example.
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and ex-post outside option (i.e. the opportunity cost of dismissal) varies according to 
the agent’s type, the optimal contract may involve randomization over the probability 
with which the worker is retained after the first period of employment. This is because 
randomization over the probability of retention equips the employer with the means to 
discriminate more efficiently among different types of employees. For instance, if more 
able types fear dismissal more than less able ones, the principal may utilize random­
ization as a mean to decrease the agent’s incentives to under-report his ability. Thus, 
randomization allows the principal to exploit the countervailing incentives generated 
by the opportunity cost of dismissal. We identify the sufficient conditions for random­
ization to be optimal, and characterize the optimal contract when these conditions are 
fulfilled.
In practice, of course, contracts including randomization are extremely difficult to 
enforce or verify by courts of law. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of 
stochastic contracts being implemented. The principal may for instance be motivated 
by reputational concerns4, which could be sufficient to guarantee that at equilibrium he 
will indeed randomize over retention, with the right probability. Importantly, though, 
the practical problems of including randomization in any legal contract imply that the 
contract between the principal and the agent will contain some ambiguity (or incom­
pleteness) over the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to guarantee retention. 
Thus, employment contracts may contain some vagueness (or incompleteness) even in 
environments where all aspects are verifiable. Indeed, as recognized by Macauley (1963) 
and Bernheim and Whinston (1998), this apparently unjustified incompleteness is often 
observed in reality.
The third chapter studies competition in price-quality menus within the context 
of an horizontally differentiated duopoly, where each firm also operates within a local, 
monopolistic market. It is assumed that the consumer’s (unobservable) valuation for 
quality is determined by the nature of his preferences over horizontal (or brand) product 
characteristics. That is, a consumer who prefers one brand over the other will derive
4 This would for instance be the case in a setting where a long-lived principal interacts over time with 
many short-lived agents, who are informed about the principal’s actions in previous periods.
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more utility from an increase in quality if this occurs within the context of his favorite 
brand, as opposed to the other brand. Equivalently, a consumer with a strong preference 
for quality when purchasing a certain brand would have a low valuation for quality when 
purchasing the rival brand. This implies that the outside option of a consumer located 
in the competitive market is a decreasing function of his preferences over quality.
From the point of view of each firm, the presence of two markets results in the con­
sumer’s outside option being either equal to zero (when he is located in the monopolistic 
market), or taking a positive value (when he is located in the competitive market), with 
a certain probability. In addition to the standard “efficiency versus informational rents” 
considerations, the principal’s contractual choice is therefore influenced by an extra ef­
fect, arising from the fact that by increasing the utility that the agent obtains from 
trading with him, the principal can enlarge the mass of types with whom he contracts. 
W ith respect to the standard monopoly scenario, this “market share” effect results in 
the principal offering higher quality levels to low types. If competition between the two 
firms is sufficiently fierce, the presence of this extra effect implies that: (1) the equi­
librium quality schedule exhibits bunching and (2) the equilibrium contract prescribes 
overprovision of quality to low types. Thus, with respect to the monopoly setting, more 
competitive environments may feature new types of distortions (namely: upward dis­
tortions). This suggests that the relationship between “toughness of competition” and 
welfare may not necessarily be monotonic.
The fourth chapter concentrates on the conflict of interest that arises between em­
ployers and employees with respect to the adoption of innovations that change the nature 
of the skills relevant for production. This conflict of interests arises because if the prin­
cipal decides to adopt the innovation, he will also replace his specialist workforce with 
new employees, who possess more appropriate competencies. Unfortunately, specialist 
workers are often also the only ones who can adequately assess the efficiency of a new 
technology. We model this by assuming that the agent is the only one to know whether 
the technology in which he specializes is the most efficient, or whether other technolo­
gies exist, that are more productive. The setting therefore differs from the standard 
adverse selection model, in that the agent’s private information concerns his relative,
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rather than absolute, productivity. This implies that, conditional on working with for 
the principal, different types of agent obtain the same utility from any given production- 
payment contract. The only difference among different types of agents concerns their 
expected utility from alternative employment (their outside option). We find that if (1) 
the agent’s outside option is lower when the technology in which the agent specializes 
is not the most efficient and (2) the principal cannot commit to employ the agent if he 
decides to adopt another technology, no renegotiation-proof contract exists that induces 
the agent to reveal his information. The implication is that the principal chooses to 
adopt the least efficient technology with a positive probability. Thus, when it comes to 
the adoption of radical new technologies, larger firms, where ownership and expertise 
tend to be separated, are disadvantaged in comparison to smaller, entrepreneurial firms.
The chapter also characterizes the decision rule that the principal obeys when he 
cannot rely on the agent’s expertise. We show that if prior beliefs are against the new 
technology (as it is often the case), technological stagnation and excessive conservatism 
tend to emerge. Finally, the chapter studies the special case where the agent may under­
take some action, which ex-ante ensures that his information will be ex-post available to 
the principal. This may for instance be achieved by allowing neutral and incorruptible 
third parties to scrutinize any evidence in support of the agent’s statement. We call 
this action “commitment to transparency”. We find that commitment to transparency 
always results at equilibrium if, conditional on it not taking place, the principal follows 
a fixed rule of technology adoption. This happens, for instance, when the principal has 
no access to external sources of information. On the other hand, if the principal condi­
tions his choice of technology on the realization of some given signal (external advisors), 
then commitment to transparency may fail to occur, and the inefficient technology is 
adopted with a positive probability.
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C hapter 2
R andom ization w ith  
T ype-dependent O utside O ptions
2.1 Introduction
One might concede that a worker’s employment history influences his prospects in the 
labour market. Dismissal from a previous job, for example, may send a negative sig­
nal concerning the worker’s ability, thereby narrowing his prospects. Thus, a worker’s 
employment prospects before he contracts with a given employer may differ from his 
prospects after, say, one period of employment. When this is the case, employers may 
randomize over the probability of termination in order to incentivize their employees. 
We explore this hypothesis within the context of a two-period employment relation­
ship, where the employee’s ability (or type) is private information and both parties are 
risk-neutral, and identify the sufficient conditions for randomization over the proba­
bility of termination to feature in the optimal mechanism. Interestingly, we find that 
randomization over dismissal is also a useful tool when the employee’s employment 
prospects (or outside option) after the first period are greater than before; this may be, 
for instance, owing to his having acquired valuable skills during this period. In fact, 
the direction in which dismissal alters the employee’s outside option does not appear 
to play an important role in the analysis. What matters, on the other hand, is the 
degree to which the difference between the agent’s outside option before contracting
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and his outside option after one period of employment varies across different levels of 
ability. We call this difference the opportunity cost of dismissal. The degree to which 
this opportunity cost varies across types determines the payoffs employees of different 
ability can expect to earn from contracts involving different probabilities of dismissal, 
which accordingly modifies their incentive to misrepresent their true type. Indeed, one 
of the conditions that we identify as sufficient for randomization to be optimal is the 
requirement that dismissal counteract the incentives which dominate under the offer of 
an efficient contract. If the dominant incentive is for the employee to understate his 
ability, then this requirement means that less able types fear dismissal less (respectively, 
benefit from experience more) than more able types. The opposite holds if the domi­
nant incentive is for the employee to overstate his ability. In both cases, the possibility 
of dismissal softens the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint, thus decreasing the 
informational rents in need of being allocated to induce a given level of production. 
Thus, randomization over the probability of dismissal proves to be a useful tool, equip­
ping the employer with the means to discriminate between different types of employees. 
Significantly, as mentioned above, this condition alone does not however guarantee the 
optimality of randomization. For the optimality of randomization to be guaranteed, it 
is also necessary to ensure that the worker’s participation constraint cannot always be 
met by means of a deterministic contract. We find that this can only be the case when 
the worker is offered no informational rents. Our principal findings can therefore be 
summarized as follows: in order for randomization to be optimal, it is sufficient that
• the opportunity cost of dismissal counteract the incentives which dominate under 
the offer of an efficient contract and
• randomization maximizes the employer’s expected profit when the employee is kept 
onto his reservation utility.
We characterize the optimal menu of contracts being offered when these conditions 
are met, finding that it prescribes efficient output production for all types, with ran­
domization being offered to sufficiently high or low types, depending on the direction 
in which the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint binds. With respect to the 
situation where all types are retained with probability one, randomization improves the 
efficiency of the optimal menu of contracts in two ways: by enlarging the range of types
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who engage in surplus-creating production at equilibrium, and by increasing production 
whenever trade occurs.
In practice, of course, contracts including randomization are extremely difficult to 
enforce or verify by courts of law. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of 
stochastic contracts being implemented. The principal may for instance be motivated 
by reputational concerns1, which could be sufficient to guarantee that at equilibrium he 
will indeed randomize over retention, with the right probability. Importantly, though, 
the practical problems of including randomization in any legal contract imply that the 
written contract between the principal and the agent will contain some ambiguity over 
the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to guarantee retention. Thus, employ­
ment contracts may contain some vagueness (or incompleteness) even in environments 
where all aspects are verifiable. Indeed, as recognized by Macauley (1963) and Bern- 
heim and Whinston (1998), this apparently unjustified incompleteness is often observed 
in reality.
2.1.1 R e la ted  literatu re
In the presence of adverse selection, the literature identifies the optimality of random­
ization with reference to situations where either
• different types have different attitudes towards risk or
• the agent’s type-space is multidimensional.
The first category is examined by Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), Brito, Hamilton, Slut­
sky and Stiglitz (1995) and Stiglitz (1982), who formalize the notion that, when the 
agent’s attitude towards risk is correlated with his type, randomization can be opti­
mally utilized to loosen the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. This is also the 
case in the present setting, but the rationale for our results is very different: in the 
present paper, all parties are assumed to be risk-neutral, and randomization proves use­
ful because the impact of dismissal upon the agent’s future employment prospects varies 
in accordance with his ability. Moreover, randomization here occurs over the probability 
with which trade takes place in the second period, rather than over the terms of trade.
1 This would for instance be the case in a setting where a long-lived principal interacts over time with 
many short-lived agents, who are informed about about the principal’s actions in previous periods.
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The second category is studied by Baron and Myerson (1982), Che and Gale (2000) 
and Rochet (1984). These papers show that stochastic mechanisms, where the decision 
to produce or not to produce is used as a screening device, may prove useful when the 
agent’s type is bi- rather than uni-dimensional. Again, the setting considered by those 
papers differs from the present one, where the agent’s type is assumed to be uni- rather 
than bi-dimensional.
Importantly, the papers cited above concentrate on static settings, and thus find it 
difficult to generate an intuitive interpretation of randomization. In contrast, the present 
paper considers a dynamic setting, where randomization can intuitively translate into 
the introduction of some contractual ambiguity concerning the conditions under which 
retention occurs.
The present paper therefore adds to the literature on stochastic mechanisms, in 
that it provides a novel rationale for their optimality, and establishes a link between 
this literature and that which studies adverse selection in the presence of type-dependent 
participation constraints. Jullien (2000) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) provide 
a general theory of type-dependent reservation utility with a continuum of types, and 
show that the properties of the optimal mechanism may differ considerably with respect 
to the so-called standard setting, where the agent’s reservation utility is assumed to 
be type-independent. Our paper extends this intuition by showing how the presence 
of type- (and history-) dependent outside options may result in randomization over 
trade in the second period being optimal. It is worth noting that our intuition builds 
on Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), who introduce and empirically test the notion that 
dismissal may negatively influence a worker’ s future employment prospects.
Finally, the subject matter studied in this paper is related to the literature on 
career concerns (Fama 1980, Gibbons and Murphy, 1992, Holmstrom 1999, Dewatripont, 
Jewitt and Tirole, 1999a and b). In contrast with that literature, however, we consider 
a setting where the informational asymmetry between the principal and the agent only 
concerns the agent’s type, rather than both his type and his actions. Moreover, in the 
present setting the agent’s career concerns arise from the fact that outside employers 
can observe his employment history, rather than his previous production.
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2.2 The m odel
We consider a two-period setting in which an employer (the principal) contracts with 
an employee (the agent) over the production of a certain amount of output in each 
period. Production is assumed to be observable and verifiable. The agent’s marginal 
cost of production, or type, is denoted by 0, and is unobservable by the principal. We 
assume that 0 is drawn from a distribution /(0) with associated density F(0), over a 
finite support <3? =  [0,0], where is increasing in 0 and is decreasing in 0. At
the beginning of the second period, the principal decides whether to retain the agent 
or not. We assume that the principal can credibly commit to condition his decision to 
retain the worker upon the outcome of a publicly observable randomizing device. We 
also assume that if the agent accepts the contract, he is contractually bound to work 
for the principal whenever the outcome of randomization prescribes so.
A contract between the agent and the principal can therefore be denoted as {7r, qi,q2 ,u>i,W2 }, 
where q\ is the amount of output that the agent must produce in period one, 7r is the 
probability with which the agent is retained after the first period, q<i is the amount of 
output that the agent must produce in period two if he is retained and W{,i = 1,2 is 
the monetary payment that the agent receives for producing output <&. We denote as 
q the highest possible amount of output that can be produced in any period. Thus, 
qi E [0,g] for i = 1,2. Notice that we rule out the possibility of randomization at the 
beginning of period one being optimal. The rationale for this originates from the notion 
that if the agent is not employed by the principal in the first instance, his employment 
history would not be affected should the outcome of randomization prescribe no trade 
with the principal. Because we are assuming risk neutrality by both parties, a contract 
including randomization under these circumstances is therefore indistinguishable from 
a deterministic contract where payment and output production are replaced by their 
certainty equivalents.
The principal’s problem consists of designing the optimal menu of contracts (or 
mechanism), from which the agent may pick his preferred choice. From the revelation 
principle, we know that this search can be confined to the set of direct revelation mecha­
nisms, whereby the agent is requested to report his type and is offered a contract which
16
is contingent upon this report.
The timing of actions is as follows:
0. The principal offers the worker a menu of contracts |tt(0 ), qi(9), q2(6), wi(0), W2 (9) 
which are conditional upon the agent’s declared type 9. If the agent declines the con­
tract, he receives his ex-ante outside option and the principal receives nothing.
1. First period: if the agent has accepted the contract in period 0, he produces 
output q\{9) and receives wage w\{9).
2. At the end of the first period, the agent is retained with a probability 7r(9), or 
dismissed with probability (1 — 7r(0)).
3. Second period: if the agent is retained, he produces output <72 M  against a 
payment W2{9). If the agent is not retained, he receives his ex-post outside option.9
We assume that the agent’s type and his expected payoff from alternative employ­
ment are perfectly correlated. If an agent of type 9 does not accept the principal’s 
contract at time zero, he expects to earn B{9) in each period from alternative em­
ployment. For simplicity, we set the discount factor to 1. The present value of the 
agent’s reservation utility when his type is 9 is therefore given by 2J9(0), while the 
second-period ex-ante outside option is B{9). If the agent is not retained after the first 
period, his expected payoff from alternative employment in the second period is given 
by C(9), which may be different from B{9)\ C{9) therefore indicates the agent’s ex-post 
(as opposed to ex-ante) outside option in period 2. We allow C(9) to be both higher 
or lower than B{9)\ if work experience strengthens the agent’s prospects in the labour 
market more than dismissal (and updating concerning his ability) weakens them, we 
should expect C(9) > B(9). Otherwise, we should expect C{9) < B{9). Because both 
B{9) and C{9) refer to the agent’s expected utility from alternative employment, as a 
function of his marginal cost of production when working for the principal, we expect 
B'(9) and C'(9) to have the same sign. A situation where this sign is negative reflects a 
positive correlation between the agent’s ability when working for the principal and his 
ability elsewhere. This is for instance the case if the job requires the agent to possess 
general and transferable skills. On the other hand, if both B'(.) and C'(.) are positive,
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a negative correlation exists between the agent’s ability when working with the princi­
pal and his ability when working elsewhere. This may reflect the relationship-specific 
nature of the skills necessary for the job.
We impose the following assumption:
A1 C"(G) =  B"{9) =  0 V0
As will become clear later, this assumption allows us to considerably simplify the 
analysis.
If an agent of type 9 accepts a contract {7T, q\, q2, wi, ^ 2 }, his net expected utility 
u(9) is given by
(wi -9 q i )  + 7T (v)2  ~  9q2) + (1 ?r) C(0) -  2 B{9)
payoff prob.of payoff in prob.of E(payoff) in reservation
in being second being second utility
first period retained period if dismissed period if
retained dismissed
If the agent accepts a contract {7T, <71, <72, wi,  ^ 2 }, the principal’s expected profit Up 
is equal to2
(vqi -  wi) +  7r (u<72 — w2) (2.2)
payoff in prob. that payoff in second period if
first period agent is retained agent is retained
where v > 9. Notice that we are assuming that if the agent is not retained, the principal’s 
payoff in the second period is zero3. Also, both parties are risk neutral with respect to 
monetary transfers and output production. In order to simplify the analysis, we impose 
the following assumptions:
A 2.a) q(v — 9) > max {C(9), B{9)} V0
2For clarity of exposition and tractability, we assume that both the agent’s utility and the principal’s 
payoff are linear in q. Our results should however still hold if this assumption was relaxed.
3 Relaxing this assumption would increase the desirability of randomization.
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A2.b) C{9) < 2B{0)V9 
A2.c) q{v - 9 )  + C{9) > 2£(0)V0
In words, assumption 2.a) says that if the agent produces the highest possible amount 
of output in any given period, it is always efficient for him to interact with the principal. 
Assumption 2.b) ensures that if the agent does not produce anything in either period, 
it is not efficient for him to accept the principal’s contract. Finally, assumption 2.c) 
guarantees if the agent produces q in the first period and is not retained in period two, 
it is efficient for him to accept the principal’s contract.
In what follows, we first solve for the first best (efficient) menu of contracts. This 
allows us to identify the nature of the inefficiencies arising from the unobservability of 
the agent’s type. We then derive the optimal mechanism if the agent’s outside option is 
type-independent. Third, we allow for type-dependence of the agent’s outside option, 
and first consider the case in which the principal is obliged to retain all agents with 
probability one (efficient retention rule). Finally, we allow for randomization. The 
reason why we introduce two intermediate steps before presenting our contribution is 
that these intermediate steps allow us to better highlight the role played by the presence 
of type-dependent outside options, and to better understand the rationale behind the 
optimality of randomization in their presence. All the proofs can be found in the 
appendix.
2.3 First best
If the agent’s type 9 is perfectly observable, the principal selects the contract he offers 
to each type 9 by maximizing
vqi{9) -  wi{9) -I- 7r(0) (vq2(9) -  w2(9)) (2.3)
subject to
qiW  G [0,g] ,* =  1,2 (2.4)
7r(0)e[O,l] (2.5)
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and the agent’s participation constraint
u{9) > 0 V0 (PC)
w\(9) can also be written as
u{9) +  eqi{9) -  7t ( 9 ) ( w 2 ( 9 ) -  9q2{9)) -  (1 -  7t{9))C{9) +  2B{9) (2.6)
substituting for w\{9) in (3.25) profit we get
0qi{9) + ir(9)q2(e)) ( v - $ )  + ( l -  tt(0))C(0) -  2B(6) -  u(6) (2.7)
Because there are no informational asymmetries, the principal sets the agent onto his 
participation constraint, so that: u(9) =  0. The principal’s expected payoff is therefore 
given by
(9l (9) + 7r(9)q2(6)) ( v - 9 )  + ( 1 -  tt(9))C(6) -  2B(9) (2.8)
The FOC with respect to 7r(9) is:
(v -  9)q2(9) -  C(9) (2.9)
In this setting, this is always positive. The FOC with respect to q2(9) is
7r(9) ( v-9)  (2.10)
while the FOC with respect to <71 (0) is
v - 9  (2.11)
Again, both expressions are always positive. The optimal contract therefore prescribes:
7r(9) = 1 and qi(9) = q2(9) = qV9 (OM*)
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R esult 1: The efficient contract specifies that the principal should hire the agent for 
both periods with probability one, and that the agent should produce q in each period.
In the first best contract, the agent is required to produce q and is retained after the 
first period with probability one. Randomization is never optimal because it introduces 
ex-post inefficiency without bringing any advantage. Because there are no informational 
asymmetries, the agent does not receive any informational rents. The payment he 
receives is just sufficient to cover his cost of production and keep him indifferent between 
contracting with the principal and accepting his ex-ante outside option.
2.4 Second best
From the revelation principle, we know that if the agent’s type is not observable, the 
principal’s search for an optimal mechanism may be restricted to the set of contracts 
which induce truthtelling (incentive compatibility).
P ro p o sitio n  1 The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for incentive com­
patibility4;
IC .I u'(6) = —qi(0) — n(0)q2(0) +  C'(6)(l — 7r(0)) — 2B'{9) at any point of differentia­
bility
IC .II  q\{9) +  7r(0) (q2(0) +  C'{9)) is non-increasing in 6.
Conditions IC.I and IC.II are the first and the second order conditions for local 
incentive compatibility. In the appendix, we derive these conditions and show that 
together they ensure global incentive compatibility.
In what follows, we indicate the mechanism derived by imposing only condition IC.I 
as the WSC mechanism (where WSC stands for “without second-order condition”). 
Whenever the WSC mechanism satisfies IC.II, solving the relaxed problem allows us to 
identify the optimal mechanism.
4 These conditions are sufficient only when there is full participation and the participation constraint 
holds. When exclusion is allowed, they are still verified on the participation set but may not suffice to 
ensure global incentive compatibility (Jullien 2000).
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2 .4 .1  T y p e-in d ep en d en t ou tsid e  op tion s
As a benchmark, we characterize the second best mechanism when B{9) =  C (9) =  0 
for all types. In that case, the principal’s expected profit when the agent’s type is 9 is 
given by
vqi(9) -  wi(9)  +  n(9)(vq2(9) -  w 2{9)) (2.12)
w\{9)  can also be written as
u{9) +  9qi {9) -  7t(9)(w2(9) -  9q2(9)) (2.13)
substituting for w\(9)  in (3.15) we get
[qi(9) +  ir(9)q2( 9 ) } - u ( 9 )  (2.14)
Notice that participation by the agent can always be ensured by offering the “null” 
contract: qi(9)  =  q2{9) = ir(9) = u(9) =  0. For the principal, this contract yields the 
same payoff as no contract. There is therefore no loss of generality in assuming that 
the principal contracts with all types.
The first order condition for incentive compatibility requires
u'(9) = - q i {9) -  7r{9)q2(9) <  0 (IC.I.l)
To induce truthtelling, informational rents have to be offered to all types but the 
least efficient with whom the principal decides to interact. The principal is faced with 
a trade off between the payoff which he can obtain when contracting with a given 
type and the informational rents which have to be offered to lower types. By having
the agent’s participation constraint bind when his type is 9, the principal can ensure
participation by all types. From the incentive compatibility constraint, we can therefore 
write
9
t*(0) =  [  (? iM  +  *(% 2(0)) de -  2 (B(6) -  B(W)) (2.15)
9
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The principal’s problem can be written as
0
max
7 r ( 0 ) € [ O , l ] ,  9 1  ( 0 ) ,  9 2 ( 0 ) € [ O
0
0
/  [(«i(0) +  t t(% 2(0)) (v -  0) -  2B(0) -
~ j  (Qi(s)-\-Tr(s)q2{s))ds]f(9)d9 (PP-1)
s
Notice that the principal only cares about expected total production. We denote q\ (9) +  
7r(9)q2(9) as Q(9) and rewrite the principal’s problem as
max 
Q(d)e[o,2q]
0
0 /  0 \
f(9)d9 (PP.l')J  I Q(0)(u -  6) +  2 (B(0) - B ( 0 ) ) - j  Q(s)d 
After integration by parts, this becomes
max
Q(0)
VJ  [(W H i, -  0) +  2 (B{0) -  B(0)) f (0) -  F(0)Q(0)\ d0 (PP.l")
The first-order condition with respect to Q(9) is
(» -« ) - 7^  (2^ )
Because uf(9) =  —Q(9), by marginally decreasing Q(9) the principal is able to
decrease the informational rents that have to be offered to types below 9, but also
decreases the efficiency of trade with type 9. The optimal WSC contract sets Q(9) =  0 if 
the first effect is stronger than the second and Q(9) = 2q otherwise. This is the case 
whenever
v~e*m ( 2 ' 1 7 )
Define 9\ by v =  9\ +  Given our assumptions on the distribution of types,
9 +  is strictly increasing in 9. The optimal WSC mechanism therefore pre-
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scribes5:
f for 9 > 9\ : Q(9) = 0 and u(9) = 0 
(for 9 < 9\ : Q{9) = 2q and u(9) =  2q{9\ — 9)
It can be easily verified that this mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility6. Notice 
that for types > 9i, the optimal contract prescribes no trade between the agent and the 
principal. Finally, notice that Q{9) =  2q corresponds to qi{9) =  q2{9) =  <7, ir(0) = 1; 
randomization is therefore never optimal.
Result 2: I f  the agent’s participation constraint is type-independent, the optimal 
mechanism specifies that the agent engages in productive trade with the principal only 
when his type less or equal to 9\ . When this is the case, the agent is retained in the second 
period with probability one, and is asked to produce q in each period. Randomization is 
therefore never optimal
If the agent’s outside options are type-independent, the introduction of informational 
asymmetries implies that the optimal contract must provide informational rents to all 
types but the highest with whom the principal decides to interact. This introduces a 
trade-off between efficiency and informational rents and induces the principal to forego 
interacting with the agent whenever his type is too high. Informational asymmetries 
therefore result in an inefficiently low amount of productive trade between the agent 
and the principal. Importantly, randomization is never optimal.
2.4.2 O ptim al m echanism  w h en  ir(9) =  1 for all ty p es
We now reintroduce the type-dependent participation constraint, and, again for bench­
marking purposes, characterize the optimal mechanism when the principal is constrained 
to retain all types with whom he engages in surplus-creating trade with probability one 
(efficient retention rule). If tt(9) is constrained to be equal to one for all types, the
5For clarity of exposition, we prefer to define the optimal contract in terms of n(0),qi(9), i  =  1,2  
and u{9). Notice however that for given 7r(0) and qi{9), u(6) implicitely defines Wi(6), the compensation 
which the agent receives if employed.
6In this case, IC.II is satisfied if Q(9) is non-increasing in 9 .The optimal WSC contract is such that 
Q'{9) =  0 whenever the Q(.) schedule is differentiable. There is a discontinuity at 9 1 , where Q(.) jumps 
from 2q for 9 —> 9± to 0 for 9 —► 9 f .  Because the discontinuity involves a downward jump, it does not 
violate incentive compatibility.
(OM.l)
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principal’s expected profit when the agent’s type is 9 is given by
vq\(9) -  w\{9) + vq2(9) -  w2(9) (2.18)
w\ (9) can also be written as
u{9) +  9qi{9) -  w 2(9) +  9q2(9) +  2B{9) (2.19)
substituting for w\(9) in (3.17) we get
(qi(0) +  q2(9)){v - 9 ) -  u(9) -  2B(9) (2.20)
In contrast with the previous case, participation by the agent can no longer be 
ensured by offering the “null” contract. To induce him to participate, the principal 
has to match the agent’s (strictly positive ) reservation utility. The implication is that 
it may be optimal for the principal to exclude some types from participating in the 
mechanism. Following Jullien (2000), we avoid the participation issue by endowing the 
principal with new trade possibilities which (i) can mimic exclusion while maintaining 
interaction and (ii) do not allow the principal to extract a positive surplus from the 
agent. We therefore assume that there exist a second trade technology, which ensures 
that the agent can be kept onto his reservation utility without any cost (or benefit) for 
the principal. This assumption allows us to restrict attention to the situation where the 
principal contracts with all types. In what follows, we refer to this second technology as 
the “no-surplus” technology, and refer to the main technology as the “surplus-creating” 
technology.
Ignoring the second order condition for incentive compatibility, the principal’s prob­
lem can therefore be written as
9
.. f  t(9i W  +  92(0))(« -  6) -  u(0)] f(9)<t>(9)d9 (PP.2)<K0)e(o,i),gi(0),g2(0)e[o,g] j
o
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subject to
u'{6) = - ( g 1(0 ) + ® (0 ) ) -2 £ '( 0 )  (IC.I.2)
u(0) >  0 (PC)
where <p{9) = 0 if the “no-surplus” technology is employed, and is equal to 1 otherwise.
Denote qi(0) + qrA@) by Q($). The first order condition for incentive compatibility can
be rewritten as
u'(9) =  -Q (9)  -  2B'{9) (IC.I.2')
When the efficient contract is offered (i.e. Q(9) — 2q), this becomes
u'(9) = -2 (B '(9 )  + q) (IC.I*)
The direction in which informational rents increase when the principal offers the efficient 
contract vary according to the sign of B'(9)+q. Thus, the nature of the trade off between 
efficiency and informational rents changes, depending on whether B'{9) + q is positive 
or negative. We consider each case in turn.
B'(9) + q>  0
When this is the case, we know that if the principal offers the efficient output allocation 
(i.e. Q{9) = 2q), informational rents are decreasing in 9; that is, more able types earn 
a higher net utility from trading with the principal than less able types.
Because informational rents are moving in the same direction as in the case with 
type-independent reservation utility, the trade-off between informational rents and effi­
ciency is the same; this implies that, for 9 > 9\, the principal finds it optimal to reduce 
production, in order to save on informational rents that have to be offered to more 
able types. In the absence of type-dependent reservation utilities this results in setting 
Q{9) =  0. With type-dependent reservation utilities, however, foregoing production 
(and switching to the no-surplus technology) may not be necessary: the principal can 
achieve the same result by setting u{9) =  u!{9) = 0. We distinguish between two cases:
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1. B'(e) > 0 :
In that case, v! (9) = 0 could only be achieved within the context of the surplus- 
creating technology by asking the agent to produce a negative quantity, something that 
is not feasible. In fact, u'(9) is < 0 for all Q(9) G [0,2q\. The agent’s participation 
constraint binds only for the highest type who creates a positive surplus. Denote this 
type as Oh ’, from incentive compatibility, we know that7
u(9) = J  Q{9)d9 + 2{B(9H) -  B(9)) (2.21)
e
Because B(9) is increasing in type, by decreasing Oh the principal can decrease the 
rents that have to be offered to lower types. This implies that the optimal contract 
might specify <f){0) =  1 only for 9 < Oh  < #i8- Thus, the presence of type-dependent 
reservation utilities does not increase (and might even decrease) the contract’s efficiency. 
This is a consequence of the fact that the agent’s reservation utility moves in the opposite 
direction as informational rents, thus reinforcing the incentives present in the standard 
setting.
2. B'(9) < 0 :
When the agent’s reservation utility decreases in 0, the principal can implement 
u{0) = u'(0) = 0 for all 0 G [0i,0] by setting u(9) = 0 and asking the agent to produce 
Q(0) =  —2B'{9) whenever his type belongs this set. In that case, the agent produces 
a positive amount without affecting the rents that have to be offered to lower 0’s. To 
ensure that the principal’s problem is non-trivial and tractable, we restrict attention to
7Because u \ 9 )  is <  0 for all Q{9)  €  [0,2g], and because incentive compatibility requires u(6) to be 
continuous, if the surplus-creating technology is utilized for trade with types in \9H ,9H — e] for any 
e >  0 , then it must also be utilized for all types below 0H — e.
8 Because we are considering the case where B{9)  +  q >  0, the exclusion of high types from surplus- 
creating trade does not violate incentive compatibility. To see that, consider a type 9 >  9h , who kept 
onto his reservation utility in the optimal meachanism. For this type, incentive compatibility requires 
B{9)  >  q{9n — 9 ) + B ( 9 h )- Given that B(9) >  B(9 h ), this condition is always respected. Notice however 
that a mechanism prescribing surplus-creating trade for high types but not for lower types would not 
be incentive compatible. In that case, incentive compatibility would require B{9) >  q(9 — 9) +  B{9)  for 
some 9 >  9. In the limit, as 9 —» 9, this condition becomes 0 >  B'(9) +  q, which is never the case, given 
that we are considering the case where B'(9) + q > 0 .
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situations where
-B'{0){v - 9 ) -  B(9) > 0 V0 (2.22)
That is, we assume that the principal can always gain a positive profit by asking the 
agent to produce Q(9) = —2B'(9) while keeping him onto his reservation utility, offering 
u(9) =  0. Because it allows the principal to earn a positive profit without affecting the 
informational rents that have to be offered to satisfy incentive compatibility, this option 
is always preferable to no (surplus-creating) trade. Given that, it is easy to see that the 
optimal WSC contract must prescribe (f)(9) = 1 V0 and:
for 9 > 9y. Q(9) = -2B '(9)  and u(9) = 0; 
for 9 < 9i: Q(9) =  2q and u(9) = 2 [q(0i -  9) +  B(0i) -  B(9)\
It can be easily verified that under assumption 1 this mechanism is incentive compatible9. 
The optimal mechanism therefore prescribes surplus-creating trade with all types, and 
is therefore more efficient than that derived in the absence of type-dependent reserva­
tion utilities. This is the case because the agent’s reservation utility increases in the 
same direction as informational rents. The trade-off between informational rents and 
efficiency is therefore softened by the necessity to provide the agent with a level of gross 
utility which increases in his ability, in order to ensure his participation.
B'(9) + q < 0
When this is the case, u'(9) =  0 could only be achieved within the context of the
surplus-creating technology by asking the agent to produce Q(9) > 2q , something that
is not feasible. In fact, u'(9) is > 0 for all Q(9) E [0,2q\. That is, informational rents are 
decreasing in the agent’s ability: because his reservation utility is strongly increasing 
in his ability, the agent’s dominant incentive is that of understating his type. The 
principal can ensure participation by all types types by having the agent’s participation 
constraint bind for the lowest 9 who produces a positive surplus. Denote this type as
9In this case, IC.II is satisfied if Q  (0) +  C'  (9) is non-increasing in 9. Because we are assuming that 
C ” (9) =  0, this is trivially the case for 9 <  9\.  For 6 >  9i,  IC.II is satisfied provided that —2B' (9) is 
non-increasing in 0.This is always the case given assumptionl. Finally, we consider the discontinuity in 
Q (9) which occurs at 9 =  9\.  Because this discontinuity involves a downward jump, it does not violate 
incentive compatibility.
(OM.2.1)
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Ol - From the incentive compatibility constraint10, we can write
e
u(0) = I  Q(6)d9 -  2 (B{9) -  B(9L) (2.23)
By increasing Ol , the principal can reduce the rents that have to be offered to higher 
types. Thus, the optimal contract may exclude sufficiently low types from surplus- 
creating trade (i.e., may prescribe Ol > £)• For a given 9l , the principal’s problem can 
be written as
o f  e \
Q m ax2_] J  Q(0)(v -  0) +  2 (B(0) -  B(0)) +  j  Q(s)ds 
€  ^ *l V £
f{0)d0 (PP.2.2)
After integration by parts, this becomes
0
J  {(Q(9)(v -  9) -  2 (B(6) -  B(9))) f{6) +  (1 -  F(8))Q(6)\ d9 (PP.2.2')
01
The first order condition with respect to Q(0) is
( v - 0 ) m  + ( l - F ( 0 ) )  (2.24)
which is always strictly positive. It follows that the optimal11 contract12 prescribes:
f for 0 > 0L: 0(0) =  1, Q{0) =  2q and u{0) =  2 [q(0 -  Ol ) + B{0L) -  B(0)\ 1 
(for 0 < Ol: 0(0) =  0 J
(OM.2.2)
Because informational rents are increasing in 0, the principal can reduce them by
10Because u'(d) is >  0  for all Q(9) G [0,2q], and because incentive compatibility requires u{0) to 
be continuous, if the surplus-creating technology is utilized for trade with types in [9l , 9 l  + e ]  for any 
e >  0 , then it must also be utilized for all types below Ol +  £•
11 The principal’s profit when trading with the agent is 2  (q(v — 6l) — B{0l)) > 0.
12 This contract would not violate incentive compatibility; consider a type 0 < 0 L who is kept onto his 
reservation utility. For this type, incentive compatibility requires B(0) — B{0L) >  q(0L — 0). Because 
B(.)  is decreasing in type, a sufficient condition for the above inequality to be satisfied for all 0 <  0L is 
that —B'{0)  >  q. Notice however that by the same reasoning, a mechanism prescribing surplus-creating 
trade for low types, but not for higher types would not be incentive comaptible.
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producing a higher level of output. Within the present setting, this results in the optimal 
contract being efficient for all 0 > Ol . This is however a consequence of the linearity 
in quantity production of the two parties’ utility functions, and would not occur in the 
presence of concavities. As shown by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Jullien 
(2000), in that case the optimal contract would prescribe overproduction for all but the 
least able type.
The results obtained in this subsection are summarized below:
R esu lt 3: When the principal is constrained to retain all types with whom he trades 
with probability one, the presence of type-dependent reservation utilities alters the fea­
tures of the optimal contract in the following way:
(i) when the agent’s reservation utility decreases in his ability (i.e. B'(0) > 0), the 
optimal contract is equally or less efficient than that described in result 2. That 
is, the optimal contract prescribes (surplus-creating) trade between the principal 
and the agent only when the agent’s type is less or equal to 0h , for some Oh  < 0 \. 
When trade occurs, the agent produces the efficient quantity.
(ii) when the agent’s reservation utility is increasing in his ability (i.e. B'(0) < 0), the 
presence of type dependent reservation utilities may improve the efficiency of the 
optimal contract. I f  B'(0)-\-q > 0, this is always the case. The optimal mechanism 
differs from that described in result 2 in that all types engage in surplus-creating 
trade with the principal. Full efficiency is however not reached, as types in [0, 0i] 
produce an inefficiently low quantity of output. These types are offered no informa­
tional rents. On the other hand, if  B f(0) +  q < 0, the presence of type-dependent 
reservation utilities may result in low types being excluded from (surplus-creating) 
trade. Whenever surplus is created, however, quantity production is efficient.
When the agent’s reservation utility decreases in his ability (i.e. B'{0) > 0), the in­
centives arising from the presence of a type-dependent reservation utility reinforce those 
present in the standard setting (i.e. under the assumption that the agent’s reservation 
utility is type-independent). This may result in additional inefficiency.
On the other hand, when the agent’s reservation utility increases in his ability (i.e.
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B'{9) < 0), the incentives arising from the presence of a type-dependent reservation 
utility run counter those present in the standard setting. If B'(6) +  g > 0, implying that 
the incentives provided by the presence of a type-dependent reservation utility are not 
too strong, the principal can keep the agent onto his reservation utility for a whole set of 
types. This enables him to enlarge the range of types with whom he contracts, without 
influencing the informational rents that have to be offered to induce truthtelling.
2.4 .3  A llow in g  for random ization
In the previous section, we have derived the optimal mechanism when the principal is 
constrained to retain all types with whom he trades with probability one (efficient reten­
tion rule). We have found that in some instances, the optimal mechanism may include 
more exclusion (and less efficiency) than in the case where the agent’s outside options 
are type-independent. In those instances, relaxing the requirement that 7r (0) =  1 for 
all types may improve the efficiency of the optimal contract by allowing the principal 
to trade with the agent while at the same time keeping him onto his reservation util­
ity. Randomization may be necessary in order for this to be the case. Alternatively, 
randomization may not required to keep the agent onto his reservation utility, but may 
allow the principal to earn a higher expected payoff while doing so. Notice that the 
optimality of relaxing the requirement that tt (0) =  1 for all types is not sufficient to 
ensure the optimality of randomization. In order for randomization to be optimal, we 
need to ensure that it is preferred to setting 7T (0) = 0. We now explore these intuitions 
more formally.
The principal’s expected profit when the agent’s type is 0 is given by
vQiW ~ v>i(0) +  7r(0)(vg2(0) -  ^ 2 (0)) (2.25)
w\ (0) can also be written as
+  Oqi(0) ~  tt(0) {w2(9) -  0®(0)) -  (1 -  tt(0))C(0) +  2B(0) (2.26)
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Substituting for w\{9) in (2.25) we get
(qi(0) +  tt(0)©(0)) (v -  6) +  (1 -  tv(9))C(9) -  2B(0) -  u(9) (2.27)
Ignoring the second-order condition for incentive compatibility, we can write the prin­
cipal’s problem as
9
m  ^  ^  rn , /  Ito  W  +  W ) (« "  «  +  (1 “  " W K W  -  -  *(*)] /0(0)G(O,1), «(0),«(*)€[(),*] J
ir(0)€[O,l] 9
(PP)
subject to
u'(0) = C(0) -  2B'(0) -  q,(0) -  *(«) (C'(9) + 9,(0)) (IC.I)
and
u{0) > 0 (PC)
Notice that 7r(0) enters the problem in a linear fashion. Thus, randomization may be 
optimal if and only if either
• randomization is necessary in order to satisfy the second order condition for incen­
tive compatibility or
• setting 7t(0) = 0  or 7r(0) =  1 would violate the agent’s participation constraint.
As shown in the appendix, the latter case may arise only if u (6) = 0, and setting
7r(0 ) =  0 or 7r(0) — 1 would violate the agent’s participation constraint when his type 
is arbitrarily close (above or below, depending on the direction in which incentive com­
patibility binds) to 6. In that case, randomization is utilized to keep the agent onto
his reservation utility, thus ensuring that v! (6) =  0. This brings us to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 In the optimal mechanism, the principal may find it optimal to ran­
domize over the probability with which type 6 is retained after the first period if and only
if
( i )  randomization is necessary in order to satisfy the second order condition for  in­
centive compatibility or
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(ii) u(9) =  0, and setting ir(9) = 0 or setting ir(9) = 1 would violate the agent’s
participation constraint when his type is arbitrarily close to 6. When this is the 
case, randomization is utilized to ensure that u' (9) = 0 .
In what follows, we concentrate on the optimal WSC mechanism, and derive the 
necessary conditions for it to prescribe randomization. We then characterize the optimal 
WSC mechanism whenever these conditions are met, and show that it satisfies the 
second-order condition for incentive compatibility and is therefore globally optimal. In 
other words, we do not provide an exhaustive description of all the circumstances under 
which randomization may be optimal, but instead identify a set of sufficient conditions 
for this to be the case.
Optimal W SC mechanism
When the agent is kept onto his reservation utility, the optimal WSC contract for any 
type 9 is found by substituting for q\ =  0 (9 )  —2B,(9)— n  (C'(9) +  q2) into the principal’s 
expected payoff, and by maximizing the resulting expression with respect to 7r and q2, 
subject to the following constraints
C1 (i) q* > 0
(ii) q2 < q
C2
( l l )  7T <  1
c -  (i ) C ' ( 8 ) - 2 B ' ( 6 ) - i r ( O ( 8 )  + q2) > 0  
(ii) 0 (8 )  -  2 B'(9) - 1  (0 (8 )  + <72) < q
The principal’s expected payoff when u(9) = 0 is given by
qi(v -  9) +  7rq2(v -  9) +  ( 1  -  7r)C(9) -  2 B(9) (2.28)
Substituting for q\ = C'(9) — 2B'(9) — 1r (C'(9) +  q2) and rearranging we get
C (9) -  2 B'(9) -  7tC'(9)(v -  9) +  ( 1  -  7r)C(9) -  2B(9) (2.29)
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The first-order condition with respect to 7r is
- C '{ 9 ) { v - 9 ) - C { 9 )  (2.30)
Whenever the expression (2.30) is positive, the principal’s expected profit from con­
tracting with 9 when u(9) = u'(9) = 0 is increasing in 7r, and vice-versa. The sign of
(2.30) therefore determines whether the principal will optimally select the highest, or 
the lowest value of 7r (9) which satisfies constraints Cl, C2 and C3. If this value is non­
degenerate, the optimal WSC mechanism prescribes randomization whenever the agent 
is kept onto his reservation utility. The following proposition identifies the conditions 
under which this is the case.
P roposition  3 The necessary conditions for the optimal WSC contract offered to a 
given type 9 to include randomization are:
(i) I f  B'(6) +  q > 0, i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint binds upwards:
a. C,{9){v — 9) 4- C{9) > 0: the principaTs expected profit from contracting with
9 when u(9) == u' (9) =  0 is decreasing in 7r;
b. C'(9) — 2B'(9)—q > 0: the agent’s informational rents when qi{9) = q, nr(9) = 
0 increase in the opposite direction to those offered when qi(9) = qi{9) = q , 
?r(0 ) =  1 .
(ii) I f  B ' (9) + q < 0, i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint binds downwards:
a. C'(9)(v — 9) +  C(9) < 0: the principal’s expected profit from contracting with
9 when u(9) = u '(9) = 0 is increasing in 7r;
b. C'(9)— 2B’{9)— q < 0: the agent’s informational rents when q\{9) =  q, n(9) = 
0 increase in the opposite direction to those offered when qi{9) = q2{9) = q  , 
7r(9) = 1.
When these conditions hold, the optimal WSC mechanism includes randomizations 
whenever the agent is kept onto his reservation utility. In that case, the contract offered
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to any type 9 specifies:
C ' ( 9 ) - 2 B ' ( 9 ) - q
<n (9) = QiW  =  g, A 0) = O(0) + q
When this contract is offered, the 'principal’s profit when contracting with type 0 is given 
by q(v — 9)(1 +  7r(0)) +  C(9)( 1 -  7r) — 2B(9) —> > 0  from assumption 2.c.
Corollary 1 Randomization may only be optimal when 0 ( 9 )  ^  B ,(9). A necessary 
condition for  this to be the case is that C(9) ^  B{9).
The intuition for proposition 3 goes as follows. First, consider the case where B'(9) +  
q > 0; the requirement that O (0 )(v  — 9) +  C(9) > 0 ensures that, conditional on 
u' (9) = 0, the principal: a) does not find it optimal to select ir (0) = 1 (case where 
B'(0) < 0) or b) can earn nonnegative profits (case where B'(0) > 0). The condition 
that C'{9)—2B ,{9) —q >  0 ensures that u' {9) =  0 is not consistent with setting 7r (0) =  0
13
Now consider the case where B'(0) + q <  0. Recall that in this case, u' (9) = 0 is 
not feasible when 7r(0) =  1. The condition that C'(9) — 2B'(9) — q < 0 ensures that 
u' (9) =  0 can be implemented when 7r (9) is sufficiently small. The requirement that 
O (0 )(v  — 9) A- C(9) < 0 ensures that, conditional on u' (9) =  0, the principal does not 
find it optimal to select 7r (9) =  0.
Finally, notice that with respect to the case where 7r (9) = 1 for all types, random­
ization may improve efficiency in two ways: by enlarging the range of types with whom 
the principal engages in surplus-producing trade at equilibrium, and by increasing pro­
duction, whenever trade occurs.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal WSC mechanism whenever the 
necessary conditions identified by proposition 3 are met. In the appendix, we show that 
this mechanism satisfies the second order condition for incentive compatibility, and is 
therefore globally optimal.
13Recall that incentive compatibility requires u'{9)  =  C'{9) — 2 B'{9)  — q\ (9) — 7r(9)(C'(9)  +  qi (9)). 
When 7r (9) =  0, u' (9) >  0 for any qi (9).
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P ro p o sitio n  4 When the necessary conditions identified in proposition 3 hold, the op­
timal mechanism prescribes surplus-creating trade with all types, and has the following 
characteristics:
(i) i f  B '(9) + q > 0 : there exist a 9R £ [9, #i[ such that
r for 9 <  9r : qi (9) =  q2 (9) =  q,7r (9) =  1, u (9) =  2 [q (9R -  9) +  B  (i9R ) -  B  (9)] j
\fo r 9 > 9r : q, (9) = q2 (6) = q, w (0) = u(6) = 0 J
(ii)  if B'(9) +  q < 0 : there exist a 9R such that
f for 9 > 9r : qi (9) = q2 (9) =  q, it (9) = l ,u (9 )  = 2 \q (9 -  9R) + B  (9R) -  B  (0)] |
l f o r 0 < %  qi (0) =  q2 (9) =  q, tt (6) =  , u{6) = Q )
When the dominant incentive is for him to understate (respectively, overstate) his 
ability, the agent is offered a stochastic contract whenever his ability is sufficiently 
low (high). The rationale for this result stems from the fact that randomization is 
optimal only when the agent is kept onto his reservation utility. Because keeping the 
agent onto his reservation utility involves an efficiency loss, this will only occur when 
the informational rents that would otherwise have to be offered to preserve incentive 
compatibility are sufficiently high.
D iscussion
Proposition 4 tells us that the conditions which are necessary for the optimal WSC 
contract to include randomization are also sufficient for randomization to feature in the 
globally optimal contract. We now discuss the economic implications of some of these 
conditions.
First, consider the case where B r (9) -hq>  0, implying that the incentive compati­
bility constraint binds upwards. In that case, a necessary condition for randomization 
to be included in the optimal WSC mechanism is that C'(9) — 2B ’{9) — q > 0; no­
tice that C'(9) — 2B'(9) —q >  0 implies that C’(9) — B'(9) > B'(9) +  q > 0. Thus, 
for the optimal WSC mechanism to include randomization when B'(9) +  q < 0 it is 
necessary that 0 (9 )  > B'(9). When C(9) < B(9), 0 (9 )  > B'(9) implies that the 
opportunity loss that results if the agent is not retained in the second period is higher
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Agent’s second period outside option Agent’s second period outside option
B(0)
loss
C(9)
C(0)
gain
B(0)
Figure 2-1: Agent’s second period outside option when 0 > C'(9) > B'(9).
for more able types. Thus, more able types fear dismissal more than less able ones. 
When C(9) > B(9), on the other hand, C'(9) > B'(9) implies that the opportunity gain 
realized after dismissal is higher for less able types. That is, less able types benefit from 
on-the-job experience more than more able ones, and are willing to sacrifice more in 
order to obtain this experience. Both situations are depicted in figure 2-1 for the case 
where both £ (.) and C(.) are negatively sloped. Figure 2-2 depicts the case where they 
are positively sloped. The common feature is that randomization allows the principal 
to increase the production allocated to less able types (higher 0’s), without affecting 
the rents allocated to lower types.
When B'(9)-{-q < 0, i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint binds downwards, on 
the other hand, randomization is included in the optimal WSC mechanism if and only 
if C'{9) — 2B'(9) —q <  0. Notice that Cf(9) — 2B'(9) — q <  0 implies C'{9) — B'(9) < 
B' (9) + q <  0, i.e. C'(9) < B ,(9). Thus, for the optimal WSC mechanism to prescribe 
randomization when B f(9) +q < 0 it is necessary that the agent’s second period ex-post 
outside option be steeper than his ex-ante one. Less able types should therefore fear 
dismissal more (respectively benefit form experience less) than more able types. This 
is depicted in figure 2-3 in the case where both £ (.) and C{.) are negatively sloped14.
14Notice that B '{6) +  q <  0 implies that B'(d)  must be <  0.
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Agent’s second period outside option Agent’s second period outside option
B(0)
loss
C(0)
C(0)
gam
B(0)
Figure 2-2: Agent’s second period outside option when 0 (9 )  > B'(6) > 0.
Randomization allows the principal to increase the production allocated to more able 
types (lower 0’s), without affecting the rents allocated to higher types.
Agent’s second period outside option Agent’s second period outside option
C(0)
gain
B(0)
B(0)
loss
C(0)
Figure 2-3: Agent’s second period outside option when 0 (9 )  < B'(9) < 0.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We have derived the sufficient conditions for randomization to be optimal when the 
agent’s labour market prospects are affected by his employment history, and we have 
characterized the optimal mechanism when these sufficient conditions hold. When un-
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derstood literally, randomization is seldom observed; however, our results show that 
employers may introduce an element of ambiguity on the conditions in need of being 
met to prevent dismissal. Hence, employment contracts may be purposely vague (or 
incomplete), even in environments where all aspects of activity are verifiable (and con­
tracting costs are negligible). Indeed, as Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Macauley 
(1963) have observed, contracts often fail even to specify verifiable obligations of the 
parties involved. This paper may be seen as contributing to the rationale of such “ex­
cessively incomplete” contracts.
2.6 A ppendix
P ro o f of p roposition  1:
If an agent of type 9 accepts the contract designed for type 9 he receives utility
u(9,9) = u(9)+qi(0)(9-9) + n(0)q2(0)(9-9) + (l- iv(9))(C {9)-C{0)) + 2B(0)-2B{9)
(2.31)
where u{9) is the utility level that type 9 obtains when truthfully declaring his type. 
The optimal declared type 9 chosen by type 9 satisfies
«'(?) +  9 i(?)(? -  9) + qi(d) + ( t t '(% 2(0) +  7T(%i(?)) (e -  6)+ (2.32)
+7r ( % 2(5) -  n'(6)(C(8) -  C(9)) -  (1 -  7r(8))C'(9) +  2B'(9) =  0 
For the truth to be an optimal response for all 9 it must therefore be the case that
u\9) = - qi(9) -  7r(9)q2(9) +  C'{0)( 1 -  ir(9)) -  2B ,{9) (2.33)
It is also necessary to satisfy the local second order condition. Conditional on 
differentiability, this corresponds to
-  -  -  0  + 7 t(% 2 W )) ~
»'(«) +  q"(0)(0 - 0 )  +  281(0) +  -1 --------------3 --------------- ’- ( 8  -  9)+o9
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+2 (^(3)9!(?) +  *10)6(6 ) + *'20 M O )  + * 2 0 ) 6 0 )  + A 0 ) C 0 ) )  ~  (2-34)
- * 20)(C(6) -  C0)) +  (1 -  *20))C"0) + 2B"0) < 0 when 6 = 6
Thus, we require:
u"(8) + 2 (6(0) +  *'(0)(« (0) + C(6)) + *(6)6(6)) -  (1 -  *(6))C'(6) + 2B"(6) < 0
(2.35)
From the first order condition, we derive
u"{e) = -q'1(9)-7r,(9)q2(9)-7r(9)q'2{9) + C"{0)(l-7r(0))-7r,(0)C,(9)-2B"(0)  (2.36)
Substituting for u"{9) in (2.34) we get
q[(9) +  7T,(9)q2(9) +  q'2(OM0) +  7r'(9)C'(9) < 0 (2.37)
Allowing for discontinuities, this condition can be rewritten as
qi(9) +  7r(9) (q2(0) +  C'(9)) is non-increasing in 0 (2.38)
where it should be recalled that we are assuming C"(9) — 0 V0. Conditions (2.33) and 
(2.38) constitute the local incentive compatibility constraints. We now verify that the 
agent does not want to lie globally. For this we require
u{9) > u{9) +  qi(9)(9-9)  +  n(0)q2(9)(0 -  9) +  (1 -  tt(3))(C(0) -  C(0)) +  2B(0) -  2B(0)
(2.39)
for any (0, 9) in [£,$]. Assume that 9 > 9\ from (2.33) we can write u{9) as 
?
+  J ( - 9 1  («) -  "(a) ( ? 2 (a) + 0(8))) ds + C0) -  C(6) -  2B0) + 2B(6) (2.40)
e
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Substituting for u(9) in (2.39) and rearranging we get 
e
0 > I  ( - 9 1  (s) -  7T(s) ( ® «  +  c"(s))) ds+qi(0)(8-9)+ tt(?) (® (?)(? -  9) -  C(9) + C(?))
(2.41)
This can also be written as 
9
0 > J  (q i0 )  ~  qi{s) +  TT{0)q2(d) -  7T(s)q2(s) +  C'{s) ^7r(?) -  7r(s)^ ds (2.42)
0
The above condition is surely true if
qi0 )  +  7r(?)g2(?) +  C'{9)tt(9) < Ql(9) +  tt(9)q2(9) +  C'(9)n{9) (2.43)
for all 9 <9.  Because C"(9) =  0 V0, C'{9) = C'(9), so (2.43) can be rewritten as
qi(9) 4- tr (% 2(?) +  C'(9)ir{9) < qi(9) +  n(9)q2{9) +  C'(9)n{9) (2.44)
for all 9 < 9. Condition (2.44) therefore requires that qi{9) +  n(9) (<?2(0) +  C'(9)) 
be non-increasing in 9. This is exactly condition (2.38). Thus, for 9 > 9 the local 
incentive constraints also imply global incentive compatibility. The case where 9 < 9  is 
analogous. ■
Proof o f Proposition 2:
If the optimal WSC mechanism prescribes that, within the context of the surplus- 
creating technology, the agent’s participation constraint only binds for one type, then 
this mechanism must necessarily satisfy
Oh
rn ™ ”  9) (qi^  +  +  C(9)(l -  tt(9)) -  2B{9)\ f{9) -
Ol
- m  {qi{8) +  tt(% 2(0) -  c'(9)( 1 -  7T(0)) +  2B'(8) ) } d8
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where
„ rm =  /  F( 8 ) if B'(9) + q > 0  
W ’ ~  {F ( 8 ) -  1 if B'( 8 ) + q < 0
The first order condition with respect to 7r(0) is given by
[©W(t> - 8 ) -  C(8 )} m  - 11(8 ) (q2 (0) +  C'(8 )) (2.45)
This condition does not contain 7r(0). Thus, the principal optimally sets 7r(9) = 1 
or 0, depending on the sign of (2.45). We conclude that, apart for the case in which 
it is necessary in order for the second-order condition for incentive compatibility to be 
satisfied, randomization may only be optimal the optimal mechanism prescribes that 
the agent’s participation constraint binds for more than one type.
We now prove that if in the optimal mechanism randomization is offered to type 9 
in order to ensure that the agent’s participation constraint15 is met, it must be the case 
that 0’s participation constraint is binding.
The possibility of 7r(9) =  0 or 7r(0) =  1 violating the agent’s participation constraint 
may arise only if
1. either u(9) =  0, and setting 7r(9) =  0 or 7r(9) =  1 would violate the agent’s 
incentive compatibility constraint when his type is adjacent (either above or below, 
depending on the direction in which incentive compatibility binds) to 9 or
2. u (9) > 0, and there exist (at least) a type 9 < 9 (if the incentive compatibility 
constraint binds upwards) or > 9  (if the incentive compatibility constraint binds 
downwards) such that setting n(9) = 0 or 7r(0) =  1 would violate the agent’s 
incentive compatibility constraint when his type is 9.
Without loss of generality, consider the case where B f(9) +  q > 0, implying that 
incentive compatibility binds upwards. Assume that u (9) > 0, and that, if the prin­
cipal offers 7r(9) = 0 or it(9) = 1 (denoted as 7r*(0)), this would violate the agent’s 
participation constraint when this type is 9, where 9 is below but not adjacent to 9. If 
7r(9) = 7r*(9 ) results in the agent’s PC being violated when his type is 9, then a type
15 Within the context of the surplus-creating technology.
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9 > 9 but < 9 must exist, such that u (9 ) = 0 when n(9) = 7r*(9). Also, it must be
/ s /
the case that u '(9 ) > 0. Notice that, because B'(9) +  q > 0, informational rents are 
decreasing in type (i.e. u'(.) < 0) whenever the efficient contract is being offered. This
/s /  ✓s/
implies that by modifying 9 ’s contract so as to ensure that u '(9 ) =  0, the principal 
could increase efficiency, without altering the informational rents that have to be offered 
to types below 9 . Moreover, if type 9 ’s rather than type 0’ s contractis modified in 
order to ensure the agent’s participation, informational rents are saved on all types in 
9,9] .■
P ro o f o f P ro p o sitio n  3
We derive the optimal contract for any type 9, subject to the agent being kept onto 
his reservation utility.
1. C'(9)(v -  9) +  C(9) > 0
When this is the case, the optimal contract is derived by setting the lowest possible 
7r, conditional on constraints
C l ,(V 2 - 0 m  q2 < q
and
0i ) C f(9 ) -2 B '(9 ) -7 r (C '(9 )  + q2) > 0
(ii) C'(9) -  2B ’(9) -  ir (C’(9) +  q2) < q
being met. Notice that if constraint C3 was ignored, the principal would optimally 
select 7r =  0, qi = C'(9) — 2B'(9), earning (C'(9) — 2B'(9)) (v — 9) +  C(9) — 2B(9) 
when contracting with type 9. Prom assumption 2.b), this amount is strictly smaller 
than (C'(9) — 2B'(9)) (v — 9). By definition, the maximum profit that the principal 
can obtain when constraint C3 is applied is <  to that obtained when constraint C3 is 
ignored, i.e. (C'(9) — 2B ,(9)) (v — 9). It follows that a necessary condition to ensure that 
the principal can earn non-negative profits when u'(9) =  0 is that C'(9) — 2B'(9) > 0. 
When this is the case, the following instances may arise
1. (a) C'(9) -  2B'(9) < q
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In this case, the principal can set 7r =  0 without violating C3. The optimal 
WSC mechanism specifies: tt = 0, q\(9) = 0 (9 )  — 2B'(9) whenever the agent 
is kept onto his reservation utility.
(b) 0 (9 )  - 2 B '(9 )> q
In this case, setting 7r =  0 would violate constraint C3(ii). By increasing ir 
above zero, a lower 0 (9 )  -  2B'(9) — t t  {C'(9) +  <72) is obtained if and only 
if 0 (9 )  +  q2> 0. A necessary requirement for this to be the case for some
<72 £ [0,<7] is that 0 (9 )  + q > 0. Also, notice that constraint C3(ii) can be
met for t t  < 1 if and only if
2B'(9) + q + q2 > 0  (2.46)
(i.e. 0 (9 )  — 2B'(9) — t t  (0 (9)  +  q2) < q  when t t  =  1 ). A necessary condition 
for this to be the case for some q2 6 [0,g] is that
B'(9) + q >  0 (2.47)
We therefore distinguish between the following cases:
i. B'(9) +  q > 0 and 0 (9 )  +  q > 0
In this case constraint C3(ii) is binding, and the optimal WSC mech­
anism specifies q\(9) =  g, tt(9) =  C whenever the agent is 
kept onto his reservation utility. Because the principal aims at setting t t  
as low as possible, he sets <72(0 ) =  <7-
ii. B'(9) +  q < 0 and/or 0 (9 )  +  q < 0
In this case, constraint C3 cannot be met for any t t  € [0,1]. It is therefore 
not possible for the principal to keep the agent onto his reservation utility 
for a whole set of types.
0 ( 9 ) ( v - 9 )  + C(9) < 0
When this is the case, the optimal contract is derived by setting the highest pos­
sible 7r, conditional on constraints C l and C3 being met. Notice that if constraint
C3 was ignored, the principal would optimally set 7r =  1, q\ =  —2B'{9) — q2 : earn­
ing —2B'{9){v — 9)+C(9) — 2B{9) when contracting with type 9. From assumption 
lb, this is strictly smaller than —2B'(9)(v — 9). Thus, a necessary condition to 
ensure that the principal can earn non-negative profits when u'(9) = 0 is that 
B'{9) < 0. When this is the case, the following instances may arise:
(a) B'(9) + q >  0
When this condition holds, we know that there exist some values of <72 in 
[0, q] such that C'{9) — 2B'(9) — 1r (C'{9) +  9 2 ) < <7 when 7r =  1. In other 
words, the principal can set 7r =  1 without violating C3. Any optimal WSC 
mechanism therefore prescribes that, whenever the agent is kept onto his 
reservation utility: ir(9) = 1, q\{9) +  q^{9) = —2B'(9), where q^(9) is such 
that —2B'(9) — q2(9) < q.
(b) B ’(9) + q<  0
In that case, the principal is unable to implement 7r =  1 without violating 
C3. This can be seen by noticing that when 7r =  1, constraint C3 requires
- 2 B'{9) - q 2 < q  (2.48)
i.e.
- 2 B ' ( 9 ) - q < q 2 (2.49)
Because we are considering the case where B'{9) +  q < 0, we know that
- 2  B'{9) - q > q  (2.50)
This implies that the above condition cannot be satisfied.
By decreasing 7r below one, a lower C'{9) — 2B'{9) —7r (C'{9) -I- ^2 ) is obtained 
if and only if C'(9) + q2 < 0. Notice that constraint C3(ii) can be met for
7r > 0 if and only if C'{9) — 2B'{9) < q. This condition can also be written
as
- 2  B \ 9 ) - q < - C ' { 9 )  (2.51)
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Because we are considering the case where B'{9)-\-q < 0, we know th a t—2B'{9)- 
q > q. A necessary requirement for C'(9) — 2B'(9) < q (i.e. —2B'(9) — q <  
—C'{9)) is therefore that
- C ’{9) > q (2.52)
We therefore distinguish between the following cases;
i. C'{9) — 2B'{9) < q (implying that C'(9) +  q < 0)
Constraint C3(ii) binds. The optimal WSC mechanism specifies qi(9) = 
q? 7r(0 ) =  c  whenever the agent is kept onto his reservation
utility. Because the principal aims at setting 7r(9) as high as possible, he 
sets q2 (9 ) =  q.
ii. C'(9) -  2B'{9) > q
Constraint C3 cannot be satisfied for any 7r G [0,1]. The principal is 
unable to keep the agent onto his reservation utility for a whole set of 
types. ■
P ro o f o f p roposition  4
First, consider the case where B'(9) + q >  0, i.e. the agent’s incentive compatibility 
constraint binds upwards. After integration by parts, the principal’s problem can be 
written as
J {[(<71W  +  ir (0 )® (0 )) (V -  6) + ( 1  -  ir (0))C(6) -  2B(9)] f{9) -
Ol
-  F{ff) [9 1 (e) +  7r(fl)®(e) +  C'(6)( 1 -  tt(0) -  2B'(6)\} d$ (2.53)
max
9i(0).92(®)€[O
7t(0)g[o,i] eL
The effect of a marginal reduction in ^i(^) upon the principal’s expected profit is 
given by
F ( 9 ) - ( v - 8 ) f ( 0 )  . (2.54)
while the effect of a marginal reduction in q2{9) is
jt(0 ) [F(0 ) -  (« -  e)f(e)] (2.55)
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Thus, whenever 9 > 9\ the principal finds it optimal to reduce production in order 
to save on informational rents.
Now consider 7r(9); the effect upon the principal’s expected profit of a marginal 
reduction in 7r(9) is
F(0)(C'(9) + q2m  -  m  [q2(e)(v - e ) -  c m  (2.56)
The first term expresses the gain in terms of smaller informational rents that have to 
be offered to types below 9. Notice that with respect to the situation in which the 
agent’s outside options are normalized to zero we have an extra term: C'(9), expressing 
the change in the agent’s second-period outside option for a marginal change in type. 
This extra term appears because the degree to which decreasing n(9) (while modifying 
transfers to keep u{9) constant) makes 9,s contract less attractive for (marginally) lower 
types also depends on the difference the second-period outside option that those types 
receive, and that which 9 receives.
The second term expresses the loss arising form the fact that (surplus-creating) trade 
with type 9 happens with a lower probability. Again, with respect to the case in which 
outside options are type-independent, we have an extra term: C(9). This term appears 
because a higher C{9) decreases the degree to which type 9 needs to be compensated 
for the fact that he may not be retained after the first period.
Whenever expression (2.56) is positive, the principal finds it optimal to reduce 7r(0), 
in order to save on informational rents that should be offered to lower types. We now 
show that there exist a 9r £ [0, 9\[ such that expression (2.56) is =  0 if 9 =  9r , negative 
if 9 < 9r  and positive if 9 > 9r .
Rewrite condition (2.56) as
+ 9 2 m  -  [® (*)(® -  e) -  c m  (2.57)
Consider 9 > 9\. For those types:
mm > v - e  (2.58)
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Thus, condition (2.56) is higher or equal than
(v -  0) (C'(9) +  q2(0)) -  [qq(9)(v - 9 ) -  C{0)\ (2.59)
which is equal to
C \9 ) { v - 9 )  + C{9) __ (2.60)
The condition C'(6)(v — 9) + C(9) > 0 is therefore sufficient to guarantee that expression
(2.56) is positive for all 6 > 9\.
Now consider 9 < 9\. For those types, q\{9) = <72(#) =  <716> so condition (2.56) is 
positive whenever
F(9) . g(v -  0) -  C(9)
f{0) > q + C'{9) ( ’
where it should be recalled that we are considering the case where q +  C'{9) > 0.
From our assumptions, is increasing in 0. Because we are assuming that C"(6) = 
0, on the other hand, decreasinS in ^17- Evaluated at 9 = 9 expression
(2.56) is equal to
~ [ q { v - 9 ) - C m  (2.62)
which is negative from assumption 2.a.
Evaluated at 9 =  9\ expression (2.56) is
C '(9 ) (v -9 )  + C(9) > 0  (2.63)
We conclude that there exist a 9r  G [£, 9\[ such that expression (2.56) is =  0 if 9 = 9r ,
negative if 9 < 9 r  and positive if 9 > 6r .
Whenever the agent’s type is > 9r , the principal selects the lowest 7r (0) compatible
16 Strictly speaking, if iz{d) =  0 the optimal <7 2(0 ) can take any value in [0,^]. Because we are 
investigating the conditions under which 7r (9) is >  0 for all types, we however restrict attention to the 
case where the optimal 9 2 (0 ) is =  <7 for all 9 < 61.
17 If we differentiate with respect to 9 we obtain
{q + c m 2 
(q +  C'(9))2
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with the agent’s participation constraint. Consider type 0; at equilibrium, constraint 
IC.I does not impose any restriction upon u(0). Given that, the principal optimally 
sets u (0) =  0 (the minimum required to ensure type 0’s participation). In order to 
satisfy the agent’s participation constraint when his type is arbitrarily close to 0, we 
require 0’s contract to satisfy v! (0) < 0. Now, because we are above type 9r, we know 
that the principal’s expected profit is strictly decreasing in 7r (0); the principal is ready 
to sacrifice 7r (0), in order to save on the informational rents that have to be offered 
to lower types. Whenever v! (0) < 0, the principal always has an incentive to decrease 
7r (0) further, so long as this is possible. At 7r (0) =  0, u' (0) > 0  (from assumption 
(i).b, in proposition 3). Thus, the optimal contract must involve u1 (0) =  0. From 
proposition 3, we know that the optimal contract conditional on u' (0) =  0 is given 
by Qi (0 ) =  Q2 (0) =  q, 7T (0) =  °   ^ ' ^ ow consider type 0 =  0 — e, for e
arbitrarily small. Because u (0) =  u'{0) =  0, we know that u (0 — e) = 0 ;  the same 
reasoning as for type 0 applies; indeed, the same reasoning applies for all types > Or .
When the agent’s type is < 0#, on the other hand, the principal sets 7r (0) =  1 ; in 
other words, the principal optimally offers the agent informational rents, rather than 
keeping him on his reservation utility. This can be seen as follows:
Denoting as 0# the highest type who is offered informational rents, incentive com­
patibility requires that for all 0  < Or (to whom the contract <71 (0 ) =  q2 (0 ) =  q, 
7r (0 ) =  1 is offered):
u(0) =  2  [B(0h ) - B { 0 ) + q  (9H ~  0)] (2.64)
Thus, by decreasing Or  the principal can reduce the informational rents that have to 
be offered to lower types. The effect of a marginal reduction in 6h upon the principal’s 
expected profit is
2F (e„ ) (B’ (9„) + q ) - f  (fin) ( 1 -  a { e ‘ ~ ? )  W® - e H) - c  (eH)}
(2.65)
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In expression (2.65), the gains from lower informational rents are given by
2 F (9H)(B '(e „ )  + q) (2.66)
while
f  [6h) (*  _  [5(” _  6lt) ~  G ( 0 h ) 1  (2-67) 
expresses the loss that the principal incurs by offering
, rr > , ir 1 i C>(eH) - 2 B ' ( 6 „ ) - q9i (% ) =  92 (fin) =  9 ,2T (#ff) =  r + j   (2.68)
(i.e. the best contract satisfying v! {Or ) — 0) instead of
9 i {Oh ) =  92 (0#) =  9 , 7T (0 #) =  1 (2.69)
Whenever expression (2.65) is positive, the principal finds it optimal to marginally 
decrease Oh  and vice-versa.
Rearranging (2.65), we see that the expression can be rewritten as
+ 1  (C> ^ H) +  ~ ^ Q{v ~  @h ) — C {Oh )] (2.70)
Because we are considering the case where both B ' {0) + q and C' {0) +  q are > 0, (2.70) 
has the same sign as (2.56), and is equal to zero at 0 = Or . Thus, at equilibrium the 
optimal Oh  is equal to Or . Thus, the optimal WSC mechanism when B' {0) +q  > 0 and
the necessary conditions identified in proposition 3 are met is given by:
for 0 < Or : qx {0) =  q2 {0) = q, tt {0) = 1 , u {0) = 2 [q {Or  -  0) + B  {Or ) -  B  (0)] 
.for 0 > Or : qx {0) =  q2 {0) = q,7T {0) = fdf ^ ~ q, u{0) = 0 
We now show that this mechanism is incentive compatible. IC.II requires
I
9i{0) +  tt{0) (9 2 (0 ) +  C'{0)) non-increasing in 0 (IC.II)
For 0 < Or , IC.II is trivially satisfied. For for 0 > Or , IC.II can be rewritten as
C1 {0) — 2B' {0) non-increasing in 0 (2.71)
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Because we are assuming B"(9) — C"(9) =  0 V0, this is always the case. Last, we 
consider the discontinuity in 7r (.) which occurs at 9r . IC.II is satisfied if
< 8 r  +  £ )(?  +  C ( 8 r  +  e ) ) <  < 8 r  - * ) ( ?  +  C '(8 r  -  e)) (2.72)
for e —*■ 0. Because C"{9) =  0, and because we are considering the case where q+C'(6) > 
0 V0, (2.72) is satisfied if
k(0r  +  e) <  7r{Or  -  e) (2.73)
which is the case, because the discontinuity involves a downward jump.
We now consider the case where B' (9)+q < 0, i.e. the agent’s incentive compatibility 
constraint binds downwards. After integration by parts, the principal’s problem can be 
written as
Oh
max , [  {[(9i(fl) + »(*)«,(*)) (® -  9) + (1 -  »(9))C(9) -  2B(6)] f (6)  +
7r(0)€[O ,l] 0 l
+  (1 -  F{Q)) [qi(0) +  tr (% 2(0) +  C"(0)( 1 -  ir{0) -  2B \ e ) \ } d9 (2.74)
The effect of a marginal increase in qi(9) upon the principal’s expected profit is 
given by
1 -  F(9) +  (v -  9)f{9) (2.75)
The above expression is always positive. Therefore, we conclude that the optimal 
WSC mechanism prescribes q\{9) =  q. By a similar reasoning, we also conclude that 
the optimal WSC mechanism prescribes q2{9) = q whenever 7r (9) > 0.
Now consider the optimal 7r (9); the effect upon the principal’s expected payoff of a 
marginal decrease in 7r (9) is18
. - ( 1  - F ( e ) ) ( C ' ( 6 )  +  q ) - f ( e ) { q ( v - 0 ) - C m  (2.76)
Whenever expression (2.76) is positive, the principal finds it optimal to reduce 7r (0), in
18 Because we are investigating the conditions under which n (6) > 0  for all types, we set <72 (0) =  q 
V0.
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order to save on informational rents that should be offered to higher types.
We now show that there exist a 9R such that (2.76) is =  0 when 9 = 9R, negative if 
6 > 0R and positive if 9 < 0R.
Rewrite (2.76) as
- 1 ic ' W +  q ) - \ n { v - e ) - c  (*)] (2.77)
The expression is positive whenever
i - f W  .  g ( v - e ) - c ( 8 )
f (8 )  > - ( & ( 8 )  + q) }
where it should be recalled that we are considering the case where C' (9) +q is negative. 
The lefthandside of (2.78) is decreasing in 9 by assumption. The righthandside of (2.78), 
on the other hand, is increasing in 019. Thus, (2.76) is strictly decreasing in 9. Evaluated 
at 9 = 9, expression (2.76) is equal to
- \ q { v - 9 ) - C { 9 ) } (2.79)
which is negative from assumption 2.a). Thus, there exist a 9R 20such that (2.76) is 
negative when 9 > 9R and positive when 9 < 9R.
When the agent’s type is < 9R, the principal selects 7r(0) so as to ensure that 
u'{9) = 0. This results in setting q\ (9) = q\% (9) = q, i t  (9) = C  When the
agent’s type is > 9R, on the other hand, the principal sets 7T (9) = 1, i.e. does not keep 
the agent onto his reservation utility. This can be seen as follows:
Denoting as 9L the lowest type who is offered informational rents, incentive com-
19 Because C" {&) =  0, if we differentiate with respect to 0 we obtain
( C ' ( 9 ) + q ) 2 
(iC ' ( d ) + q )2
20 Which may be below 0, in which case (2.76) is negative for all types in our domain.
21 The rationale is akin to that for the case where B'(6) +  q >  0.
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patibility requires that for all 9 > 9L:
u{9) = 2 [B (9l ) -  B  {9)+ q  (i9L -  0)] (2.80)
Thus, by increasing 9L the principal can reduce the informational rents that have to
be offered to higher types. The effect of a marginal increase in 9L upon, the principal’s
expected profit is
- 2  (1 - F  (**)) (b '  (9l ) + g)- f  (eL) f  1 -  C' (gL^ y _ L) ~ - )  [q (v - 9L) - c  (**)] 
(2.81)
In expression (2.81), the gain from lower informational rents is given by
- 2  (1 -  F  (9l )) (.B' (9l ) +  q) (2.82)
while
/  (*L) ( l  -  ^  (» - 0 L) ~ C  (*")] (2-83)
expresses the loss that the principal incurs by offering
,„rN ,*r\ C '(9L) - 2 B ' ( 9 L) - q
9i (eL) =  92 (9L) =  9 , tt («*■) =  - 1 - ( g f . j V g - ----- (2.84)
(i.e. the best contract such that v! (9L) =  0) instead of
Qi (^L) =  Q2 (0L) =  q, 7T (9l ) = 1 (2.85)
Whenever (2.81) is positive, the principal finds it optimal to increase 9L and vice-versa. 
Rearranging, we see that (2.81) can be written as
2§f^rf { ~ ( l ~ F  {eL) { c ' ( f , i ) + 7 i ) ~ f  {0L)  [5  ( u "  ■eL) - c  ( * i ) ] }  ( 2 - 8 6 )
Because we are considering the case where B' (9L) +  q and C' (9L) +  q are both 
negative, (2.86) has the same sign as (2.76), and is =  0 at 9 = 9R. Thus at equilibrium
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the optimal 0L is equal 9R.
Thus, the optimal WSC mechanism when B' (9)+q < 0 and the necessary conditions 
identified in proposition 3 are met is given by:
for 9 > 0R: qi {9) =  q2 (9) = q,ir (9) =  1, u {9) =  2 \q (9 -  9R) + B  (9R) -  B  (0)] 
for 9 < 9r : qY (9) = q2 (9) = q,ir (9) = , u(9) = 0
We now show that this mechanism is incentive compatible. IC.II requires
qi{9) +  7t(9) (q2(9) +  C \9 )) non-increasing in 9 (IC.II)
For 9 > 9r , IC.II is trivially satisfied. For for 9 < 9R, IC.II can be rewritten as
C' (9) — 2B' (9) non-increasing in 9 (2.87)
Because we are assuming B"(9) = C"(9) = 0 V0, this is always the case. Last, we 
consider the discontinuity in tt (.) which occurs at 9R. IC.II is satisfied if
7T{Or  +  e) (q +  C'(9R +  e)) <  7r(9R -  e) (q +  C'{9R -  e))  (2.88)
for e —> 0. Because O'iG) =  0, and because we are considering the case where q+C'{9) < 
0 V0, (2.72) is satisfied if
n(0R +  e) > 7t{9r  -  e) (2.89)
which is the case, because the discontinuity involves an upward jump. ■
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C hapter 3
N onlinear Pricing and 
M ulti market D uopolists
3.1 Introduction
Two of the most active areas of research in industrial organization are that which studies 
horizontal product differentiation within an oligopolistic setting (such as in Hotelling 
(1929) and that which explores the degree to which a monopoly may take advantage of 
its position by operating nonlinear pricing (such as in Mussa and Rosen(1978)).
This paper belongs to the recent body of literature (mainly Stole (1995), Rochet 
and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) which tries to unify these two 
streams of research by studying nonlinear pricing within the context of an horizontally 
differentiated duopoly. We add to this literature by explicitly superimposing two empir­
ically sound features upon the basic model, and showing that this has rather dramatic 
implications for the equilibrium contracts.
The first distinctive feature of this paper concerns the assumption that the con­
sumer’s marginal valuation of quality is determined by his preferences over horizontal 
product characteristics: a consumer who prefers one brand over the other will derive 
more utility from an increase in quality if this takes place within the context of his 
favorite brand, as opposed to the other brand. Equivalently, the difference in utility 
that a consumer experiences when he switches from his favorite brand to another is
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positively correlated with his preference for quality when purchasing the favorite brand. 
This implies that consumers who purchase goods of higher quality also have stronger 
brand preferences and vice-versa.
The motivation for this way of modeling preferences is empirical, and comes from 
the observation that, in some markets, consumers who purchase higher qualities are 
more “brand loyal” than those who purchase lower qualities. This is well documented 
within the context of the car market1: Goldberg (1995), for instance, combines a disag­
gregate model of demand with an aggregate oligopoly model of supply to characterize 
the American automobile market in 1983-89. She finds evidence that cross (i.e. within 
brands) price elasticity is highest for intermediate and standard automobiles, while is 
lowest for sport and luxury cars. These findings are confirmed by Berry, Lewinsohn and 
Pakes (1995), who develop a framework which allows to estimate demand parameters 
from product-level and aggregate consumer-level data. They apply these techniques 
to the US automobile market, showing that the most elastically demanded products 
are those in the most crowded market segments: the compact and subcompact models. 
Finally, Feenstra and Lewinsohn (1995) take the approach of utilizing aggregate data, 
and model the American car market as an oligopoly in which products are differentiated 
along multiple dimensions. Again, their findings suggests that cross price elasticities in 
the high quality segment are lower than those in the low quality segment.
We indicate the consumer’s preferences over horizontal product characteristics by his 
position over an hypothetical segment. Crucially, we concentrate on settings where the 
two competing firms are located at the extremities of this segment2. There is therefore 
a one-to-one correspondence between the dispersion of the consumer’s preferences and 
the degree of differentiation between the varieties (or brands) sold by the two firms; 
situations where preferences over horizontal characteristics are relatively homogeneous 
are therefore also characterized by a low degree of differentiation between the varieties
1 Indeed, Verboven (1996) calls this feature a “stylized fact” within the car market.
2D ’aspremont et al. (1979) show that, for quadratic trasportation costs, the equilibium of the two- 
stage game where (1) firms simultaneously choose their locations and (2) taking their locations as given, 
firms compete in prices, has the two firms locating at the extremities of the segment. Our assumption 
can be interpreted as hypothetising the validity of this result when, in the second stage of the game, 
firms compete in price-quality menus.
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sold by the two firms, and vice-versa.
The second distinctive feature of this paper concerns the assumption that each firm 
operates both within a local (where it is a monopolist) and a competitive market (where 
it competes against another firm). This division between markets may be interpreted 
either in a literal way (i.e. as modelling markets which are geographically separated3) 
or as capturing the fact that consumers may differ in their switching costs. From 
the point of view of each firm, the presence of two markets results in the consumer’s 
reservation utility being either equal to zero (when the consumer is located in the local 
market) or taking a positive value (when the consumer is located in the competitive 
market) with a certain probability. This implies that, in addition to the standard 
“efficiency versus informational rents” considerations, the principal’s contractual choice 
is influenced by an extra effect arising from the act that by increasing the utility that 
the agent obtains from trading with him, the principal can enlarge the mass of types 
with whom he contracts. With respect to the standard monopoly scenario, this “market 
share” effect results in the principal optimally offering higher quality levels. We find 
that, if the degree of substitutability between the products sold by the two firms is 
sufficiently high, the “market share” effect is strictly positive for sufficiently low types, 
but abruptly disappears as soon as the agent’s utility schedule crosses his (highest 
possible) reservation utility. The implication is that the equilibrium quality schedule 
exhibits bunching; if this was not the case, the quality schedule would experience a 
downward discontinuity, thus violating incentive compatibility. The firm’s ability to 
discriminate among different types of consumers is therefore inhibited by the presence 
of two types of markets (one where it is a monopolist, one where it competes against 
another firm). This is our first result.
Our second and main result concerns the welfare properties of different competitive 
environments. We find that, if the distribution of consumer’s types is sufficiently nar­
row (and, accordingly, the degree of substitutability between the varieties sold by the 
two firms is sufficiently high), the equilibrium contract exhibits overprovision for suffi­
ciently low types. This is because, at equilibrium, the strength of the “market share”
3 This is a common feature in markets for natural resources, such as gas.
57
effect is directly proportional to the degree of homogeneity in consumer preferences; as 
the degree of homogeneity in consumer preferences augments, high quality allocations 
therefore become increasingly attractive. The implication of our second result is that 
more fiercely competitive environments may not necessarily be characterized by higher 
efficiency. Although the downward distortions in the qualities offered to high types may 
decrease in more competitive environments, other types of distortions (namely: upwards 
distortions) may appear.
3.1 .1  R e la ted  literatu re
The literature that studies of oligopolistic competition in contracts when consumers’ 
tastes are unobservable focuses on the behavior of firms who only operate within one 
market, and mainly consists of Stole (1995), Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong 
and Vickers (2001).
Stole (1995) shares our assumption that a consumer’s valuation of quality is deter­
mined by the nature of his preferences over horizontal (brand) product characteristics, 
but assumes that the consumer’s preferences over vertical product characteristics are 
perfectly observable. He finds that the equilibrium quality schedule exhibits the same 
features as that which would be offered by a monopolist.
Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) consider a duopoly 
setting in which the (unobservable) preferences over vertical and horizontal product 
characteristics are uncorrelated. This is in contrast with the present setting, where a 
correlation exists between a consumer’s marginal valuation of quality and his preferences 
over horizontal product characteristics. They find that, conditional on full market 
coverage4, the symmetric equilibrium is entirely efficient; that is, all types consume 
the efficient quality level5. This is a very strong result, which may be interpreted as 
implying that, when firms compete in price-quality menus, any form of competition 
(even if imperfect) results in welfare being maximized. More fiercely competitively 
environments should therefore exhibit a (weakly) higher degree of efficiency than less 
competitive ones.
4 I.e. conditional on all consumers purchasing from either firm.
5Inderst ([?]) finds the same result in the context of a matching model of buyer-seller exchange.
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This work puts these papers into perspective, by emphasizing the role that demand 
and supply characteristics play in reaching their conclusions.
Finally, Biglaser and Mezzetti (1993) study the game between two asymmetric firms, 
who compete through contract offers to attract a worker. Both the worker’s innate 
productivity and his effort are assumed to be his private information. They find that, 
at equilibrium, the optimal contract results in the effort of low-ability types being 
greater than the efficient level. Their conclusions are therefore qualitatively similar to 
ours, although they are derived in a fundamentally different environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we first introduce the gen­
eral model (section 2) and then proceed to discuss our results (section 3). Section 4 
concludes. All the proofs can be found in the appendix.
3.2 The m odel
Players
There are three players in the game: the consumer (agent) and the two produc­
ers/firms (principals), denoted as I and r 6. The consumer may consume either zero or 
one unit of an indivisible good, which can be produced by either firm. More specifically, 
each firm can only produce a certain variety of the good: firm I can only produce variety 
(or brand) L, while firm r can only produce variety R . Also, each firm can produce 
the good at any quality level q G [0, Q[, where Q is assumed to be finite but very large. 
Quality is an objectively measurable product characteristic7.
Contracts
A contract between a principal and the agent consists of a pair {g,p}, specifying 
the quality q G ]0, Q\ of the good that is traded and a monetary transfer p G 
that the agent pays upon purchase. Notice that we restrict attention to deterministic
6Standing for “left” and “right”.
7 To fix ideas, we may think of the product as a computer, and model the two firms as producing 
either PC ’s or Macintoshes. In that case, quality could for instance refer to the speed at which the 
computer can perform a certain operation.
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mechanisms. That is, we rule out the possibility for the principal of offering contracts 
which randomize over the probability of trade with the agent.
Markets
There are three markets, denoted as ra*, m r and mc8. Market mi (respectively, mr) 
is firm V s (respectively, firm r ’s) local market. That is, firm I is market mi s sole 
producer (and firm r is market mr ’s sole producer). Market mc, on the other hand, is 
supplied by both firms. Thus, each firm may operate in two markets: its local market, 
and market mc.
Information structure
The consumer’s private information is two-dimensional. First of all, it concerns his 
preferences over product characteristics, which cannot be observed by the principals. 
Second, it concerns his market location, which may ex-ante be either m/, m r or mc. 
Conditional on contracting with the agent, firms update their beliefs, and conclude that 
the agent must be located either in their local market, or in market m c. We introduce the 
following notation: conditional on contracting with the agent, firm i ’s beliefs (i =  r, I) 
are as follows:
{ s = probability with which the agent is located in firm Vs local market 1 1 — s =  probability with which the agent is located in market m c )
for some s G [0,1]. Thus, s indicates the relative size of the local markets9, with respect 
to market m c.
Preferences
The agent’s preferences over horizontal product characteristics (or brand prefer­
ences) are indicated by his position over an hypothetical segment of length z > 0, mea­
sured between 0 and z. Ex-ante, the consumer’s location over this segment is drawn
8Where c stands for “competitive”.
9 In order to keep things as simple as possible, we only consider the case in which the two firms are 
perfectly symmetric, i.e. si =  sr =  s.
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Figure 3-1: Distribution of preferences over horizontal product characteristics.
erences with respect to a given brand is inversely proportional to the distance between 
the consumer’s and the brand’s location on the segment. We assume that brands L 
and R  are located at the extremities of the segment; that is, we set brand L’s position 
at zero, and brand R ’s position at z (maximal differentiation). The parameter z is 
therefore a measure of both the dispersion of the consumer’s preferences and the de­
gree of horizontal differentiation between the varieties sold by the two firms. A small z 
characterizes markets where consumer preferences are relatively homogeneous and the 
varieties sold by the two firms are close substitutes. Vice-versa, a large z characterizes 
markets where consumer preferences are strongly heterogeneous, and the varieties sold 
by the two firms are very dissimilar.
The consumer’s preferences over vertical product characteristics are entirely deter­
mined by his brand preferences. That is, the consumer’s marginal valuation of quality 
varies across brands according to the nature and intensity of his horizontal preferences. 
Denoting as ki(x), i =  I, r the marginal valuation of quality when consuming the good
10The assumption that the consumer’s horizontal preferences are uniformly distributed ensures the 
perfect symmetry exists between the two producers, which in turn simplifies our analysis.
according to a uniform10 distribution. The intensity of the consumer’s horizontal pref-
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Figure 3-2: Consumer’s marginal valuation of quality, within each market.
produced by firm i of a consumer located at x, we have
( ki(x) = 1 — x  and 
\/cr (a;) =  1 — z + x
From the point of view of each firm, the consumer’s marginal valuation of quality 
within each market is therefore uniformly distributed in [1 — z,l]. This is depicted in 
figure 3-2.
Notice that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ki(x) and kr(x), given
by:
kr(x) — 2 — z — ki(x)
and
ki(x) =  2 — z — kr(x)
If the agent is located at x < zf2  he favours the variety produced by Z, while if he 
is located at x > z j2  he favours the variety produced by r; if the agent is located at 
x = z / 2, he is indifferent between the two varieties.
Payoffs
Agent
The utility of a consumer located at x consuming a good of quality q at price p 
depends upon the good’s brand, and is given by:
ki{x)q — p if he buys from firm I and 
kr(x)q — p if he buys from firm r
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If the consumer does not consume the good at all, his utility is equal to 0.
Notice that the agent’s gross utility from consumption only depends upon his hor­
izontal preferences, and is independent of the market in which the agent is located. 
Conditional on contracting with the agent, producers are therefore unable to utilize 
price-quality offers to discriminate between agents who have the same preferences over 
horizontal product characteristics, but belong to different markets11. Although the 
agent’s private information is two-dimensional, his type-space12 is consequently uni­
dimensional, and only concerns his preferences over horizontal product characteristics.
Principals
A principal’s payoff is given by
2
p — if he sells quality q at price p 
0 if he doesn’t sell anything
Notice that the two principals are perfectly symmetric.
A gent’s outside option
The agent’s outside option when contracting with a given principal is defined as the 
highest utility which the agent could obtain when not dealing with this principal. Thus, 
the agent’s outside option varies according to the market in which he is located. If the 
agent is located in market mi , for instance, his outside option when contracting with 
firm I is given by 0; this is because firm I is the sole active producer in market mi. The 
same applies to the agen t’s outside option when located in market m r. If the consumer 
is located in market rac, on the other hand, his outside option (as a function of x, his 
positioning over the segment representing horizontal product characteristics) is given 
by
{max{0, ur (x)} when contracting with firm I 
max{0, ui (x)} when contracting with firm r
11 More precisely, producers are unable to discriminate between consumers located in their local market 
and in market me-
12Defined as any private information that is relevant to the agent’s decision-making, conditional on 
purchasing from a given principal.
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where Ui(x), i = l,r  denotes the highest utility which an agent positioned at x  can 
obtain when contracting with firm i.
Tim ing/structure of the game
The timing of the game is at follows:
1. Nature determines the agent’ s market location and his horizontal preferences; the 
two firms simultaneously propose a menu of contracts from which the agent may 
chose.
2. The agent either refuses to contract with either firm (in which case the game ends 
immediately and all players obtain a payoff of zero) or selects a quality-price pair 
from the menu of one of the two firms.
3. The selected firm produces the good (at the stipulated quality level), and trades it 
with the agent. The agent consumes the good, and the firm receives its monetary 
payment.
Strategies
Principals
Each principal’s problem consists of designing a menu of contracts (or mechanism), 
from which the agent may chose his preferred choice, should he purchase the principal’s 
product variety. At equilibrium each firm selects the optimal mechanism, taking the 
other firm’s mechanism as given. From the revelation principle, we know the search for 
the optimal menu of contracts may be confined to the set of direct revelation mecha­
nisms, whereby the agent is requested to report his type, and is offered a contract which 
is contingent upon this report. This defines the principals’ strategy space.
Agent
A strategy for the agent specifies
• the identity of the principal with whom he decides to contract, and
• his reported type when contracting with this principal.
Throughout the analysis we concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
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3.3 Im plications
Consider firm i = l,r. The utility obtained by a consumer of type k{ = k consuming 
quality q of the variety sold by i at price p is given by
u{x,p,q) = kq — p
Denote as Ui (k) the utility which a consumer of type ki = k obtains when contracting 
with firm i. If the consumer is located in market rrii, his outside option when contracting 
with i is zero. On the other hand, if the consumer is located in market m c his outside 
option is given by
Bi (k ) =  max (0, Uj (2 — z — k ))
where Uj (2 — z — k) is the highest payoff which a consumer with marginal valuation 
kj = 2 — z — k obtains when contracting with firm j  = r,l. Conditional on him not 
belonging to market mj, the consumer’s reservation utility is therefore given by
0 with probability s 
Bi (k) > 0 with probability 1 —-  s}  ^
The measure Mi (Ui (k ) , k ) of consumers of type k who contract with firm i is given 
by:
Mi (Ui (k) , k) =  <
0 if Ui (k) < 0
f  H Bi{k) > Ui{k) > 0  (3.2)
\  if Ui (k) > Bi (k )
Notice that by offering the “null” contract: qi (k ) =  Ui (k ) =  0, the principal can
always ensure the agent’s participation whenever he is located in market rrii. For the 
principal, this contract yields the same payoff as no contract. There is therefore no loss 
of generality in assuming that the principal always contracts with the agent whenever 
he is located in his local market. This implies that we may restrict our attention to the 
case where the principal contracts with all types with a positive probability. Defining
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firm i ’s marginal type ki as the type for whom13
Ui
we can therefore write
-  for k G 1 — z,k{ 
\  for k e  ki, 1
(3.3)
Conditional on the agent’s truthfully declaring his type, the firm’s profit when con-
Lemma 1: The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for incentive com­
patibility:
1. IC.I u'i (k) =  qi (k) at any point of differentiability
2. IC.II qi (k ) is non-decreasing in k.
Corollary 1: Conditions IC.I and IC.II imply that at equilibrium Ui(.) is a contin­
uous function.
13 We are implicitely assuming that Ui (.) and Bi  (.) do not overlap for more than one type. This may 
however be the case if Ui (.) =  Bi (.) =  0. In that case, the marginal type should be defined as the 
lowest type for whom U i  ( . )  =  Bi ( . ) .
tracting with type k is given by pi (k ) — Substituting for pi (k ) =  kqi (k) — Ui (k)
this becomes
Firm t ’s programme is to maximize 
1
(P)
1—z
subject to incentive compatibility:
k = arg max 
%
(IC)
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In what follows, we refer to the mechanism derived by imposing condition IC.I only 
as the WSC mechanism (where WSC stands for “without second-order condition”). 
Whenever the WSC mechanism satisfies IC.II, solving the relaxed problem allows us to 
identify the optimal mechanism. On the other hand, if the WSC mechanism violates 
IC.II, the solution to the principal’s problem is found by explicitly incorporating con­
straint IC.II, and involves bunching over a set of types (see for instance Laffont and 
Martimort, pp. 140-141).
Lemma 1 identifies the conditions which need to hold for both firms at equilibrium. 
This allows us to make some inferences concerning the agent’s reservation utility, when 
he is located in market m c. From above, we know that
Bi (k) =  max (0, Uj (2 — z — k))
This implies that
B'i (k)
From lemma 1, we know that
u'j (2 — z — k) = qj (2 — z — k) —► > 0
where qj (2 — z — k) denotes the product quality which a consumer of type kj — 2 — z — k 
is offered when contracting with firm j .  Moreover, the utility schedules offered by the 
two firms at equilibrium must be continuous. This brings us to the following lemma:
Lemma 2: In any equilibrium, of the game, the agent’s reservation utility when he 
is located in market m c is continuous and non-increasing in his type.
Notice that continuity is ensured for s > 0, but may break down when s = 0, i.e. the 
firms only operate in market mc. The reason for this is that, under such circumstances,
the mass of types below ki who contract with firm i = l ,r is  equal to 0. Thus, for a given
price-quality menu offered by firm j  = r, Z, optimality does not impose any restriction 
upon firm i’s quality schedule over that range. Moreover, firm i may strategically alter 
its quality schedule in order to influence firm j  optimal response. This considerably
either 0 or 
-Uj (2 -  z -  k)
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Agent’s reservation utility
Bj(kj) Probability: 1-s
Probability: s
1-z
Figure 3-3: A possible reservation utility schedule.
complicates the analysis, and is the reason why we restrict s to be strictly positive.
Lemma 2 implies that it is impossible for the principal to keep the agent onto his 
reservation utility over a whole set of types while selling a product of strictly positive 
quality. Surplus-creating trade between the principal and the agent therefore results 
in the agent obtaining a strictly positive informational rent whenever his type is above 
1 — z. Figure 3-3 depicts a possible reservation utility (or outside option) schedule.
Lemma 3: At equilibrium, market m c is fully covered: all consumers located in that 
market engage in surplus-creating trade.
Corollary 2: In any symmetric equilibrium, each firm’s marginal type is 1 — | .
Lemma 3 implies that at equilibrium:
• either the lowest type with whom each firm trades is below 1 — |  or
• the lowest type with whom each firm trades is equal to 1 — | .
We now explore the properties of the optimal WSC mechanism. If we ignore IC.II, 
the principal’s problem can be written as
l
max / (Ui (k ), k )
Ui (k ) , q i (k ) J
l - z
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kqi  ( k ) -  Ui ( k ) - dk (P)
subject to
u 'M  =  ?i (fc) (IC.I)
From IC.I, we have:
k
U{ (k) = Ui (1 -  z) +  J  qi (x) dx (3.5)
1—z
for all k. The principal’s problem may therefore be rewritten as
max
l /  k \  r 2 kJ  M i l u i ( l - z ) +  J  q i (x )d x ,k \  fcg; (fc) -   1 ^ ( 1  -  z) -  J  qi(x)
l - z  \  1 - z  /  L 1—z
/ dx 
(P')
dk
This is equivalent to
1 , 7  ™ '  r  , 2
Mi |  Ui (1 -  z) 4- J  qi (x) dx , kmax 
U i ( l - - z ) , g » ( A : )
1—z \  \  1—z
kqi (k ) -   Ui (fc) -  (k) qi (k)
(P")l
where (k ) = J  Mi (ui (k) , A:) indicates the mass of types above /c with whom the
k
principal contracts.
In the canonical setting, where the principal is assumed to be a monopolist,- the 
lowest type being served typically earns no rents; because the agent’s reservation utility 
is equal to zero for all types, offering no rents to the lowest type being served is consistent 
with full participation, and is therefore optimal. Here, on the other hand, Ui (1 — z) =
0 is not sufficient to ensure the agent’s full participation; the implication is that by 
increasing Ui (1 — z) above zero, the principal can enlarge the mass of types with whom 
he contracts at equilibrium (“market share” effect). We conclude that the principal 
may optimally set Ui (1 — *) > 0. The “market share” effect of a higher Ui (1 — z) is 
illustrated in figure 3-4.
A similar reasoning applies to the choice of quality allocations; in addition to the 
standard “efficiency versus informational rents ” trade-off, the principal is here con-
► dk
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Agent’s
utility
U j( l- Z )
Marginal 1
type
Figure 3-4: Market share effect of increasing U{ (1 — z)
fronted with an extra effect, arising from the fact th a t by increasing q i (k ), he can 
enlarge the mass of types above k  with whom he contracts. This is illustrated in figure 
3-5. W ith respect to a monopoly scenario, the presence of the “market share” effect 
results in the principal optimally offering higher quality levels.
Interestingly, as noted by Rochet and Stole (2002), whenever the optimal U{ (1 — z) 
is strictly above zero, the optimal WSC quality level offered to type 1 — z  is efficient, 
while th a t offered to all types above 1 — z  but below the marginal type is above the 
efficient level. The intuition for this can be seen as follows: at an interior solution, 
the optim al Ui (1 — z) balances the principal’s desire to enlarge his market share on one 
hand, and his desire to minimize the rents th a t have to be offered to the agent in order 
to ensure incentive compatibility on the other.
Now consider the principal’s choice of g* (1 — z); this choice is determined by the 
interplay of three factors: the desire to expand the market share, the desire to minimize 
the informational rents tha t have to be offered to the agent, and the the desire to 
maximize the to tal surplus obtained when contracting with type 1—z. Because Ui (1 — z) 
has been chosen optimally, the first two factors annul each other. In his contractual 
offer to  type 1 — z , the principal has therefore no incentive to deviate from the efficient
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Agent’s
utility u(ki)
B(k,)
u(l-z)
Marginal 1
► k,
type
Figure 3-5: M arket share effect of increasing qi (ki), when ki is below the marginal type, 
quality level.
Finally, consider any type k E ; evaluated at k, the market share effect1 -  z,ki
has the same strength as for type 1 — z, while the informational rents th a t result from 
an increase in qi (k) are lower than those arising from an increase in qi (1 — z). It follows 
th a t the principal’s incentive to increase quality must be higher for type k  than for type 
1 — z. Given th a t qi (1 — z) is equal to the efficient level, we conclude th a t qi (k) must 
be above the efficient level.
Im portantly, as can be seen from figures 3-4 and 3-5, the “market share” effect 
of increasing quality is only present for those types who are located below the firm’s 
marginal type ki. For types above the marginal type, this ex tra effect is absent, and the 
optimal quality is selected in the same way as in the canonical setting. The implication is 
th a t, whenever the marginal type is not the lowest type with whom the principal trades, 
the optimal WSC quality schedule exhibits a downward jum p at k  = k i .  Clearly, this 
violates condition IC.II. Thus, the optimal quality schedule must include bunching over 
a whole set of types. On the other hand, if the marginal type is the lowest type with 
whom the principal trades, the optimal quality schedule exhibits the same properties as
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that offered by a monopolist. The following proposition summarizes our results.
P ro p o sitio n  1: I f  the marginal type is also the lowest type with whom firms engage 
in surplus-creating trade, the optimal quality schedule exhibits the same properties as 
that offered by a monopolist
I f  the marginal type is not the lowest type with whom firms engage in surplus-creating 
trade, the optimal quality schedule for both firms exhibits pooling over some interval 
fo.fci]. The quality consumed by types below k\ exceeds what would be offered by a 
monopolist, while that consumed by types higher or equal than k\ is equal to that which 
a monopolist would offer.
In equilibria where the marginal type is not the lowest type with whom firms engage 
in trade, pooling emerges, implying that the presence of two types of markets reduces the 
principal’s ability to discriminate among different types. Although the “market-share” 
effect is only present for types located below the marginal type14, through pooling 
the quality offered to types in ki,k\ is also pushed above what would be offered in 
a monopoly. While the familiar result of “efficiency at the top” and underprovision 
for sufficiently high types remains, the presence of a rival firm in market m c provides 
a competitive stimulus, which results in higher quality being allocated to sufficiently 
low types. This is however the case only if the marginal type is not the lowest type 
with whom firms engage in surplus-creating trade trade at equilibrium. The following 
proposition shows that this is always the case whenever 2  is sufficiently low.
P ro p o sitio n  2: When z < (depicted in figure 3-6), the marginal type 1 — |  is
8
not the lowest type with whom firms engage in surplus-creating trade at equilibrium.
The intuition for the result essentially stems from the fact that, at equilibrium, the 
marginal type’s valuation of quality (given by 1 — | )  is inversely related to 2 . As z 
grows smaller, the attractiveness of types located below the marginal type increases15, 
implying that the principal finds it optimal to trade with them.
Notice that the threshold z below which pooling necessarily occurs is an increasing
14It should be remembered that the firm’s marginal type depends on the mechanism being offered. 
Here, we are referring to the firm’s marginal type in the optimal WSC mechanism.
15 Because their marginal valuation for quality increases.
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Figure 3-6: 7+1
function of s. This implies that, as the relative size of each firm’s local market with 
respect to market m c increases, the range of z for which pooling occurs increases as well. 
This is the case because a higher s increases the attractiveness of trade with lower types, 
who are exclusively located in the local market. The next proposition studies the effi­
ciency properties of different competitive environments. In particular, it addresses the 
question of whether a small z (indicating “tougher” competition) necessarily translates 
in higher efficiency.
P ro p o sitio n  3: For any s, there exists a value z (s) such that whenever z < z(s)  
the equilibrium exhibits overprovision for sufficiently low types. The function mapping 
s into z (s) is concave, with lim ^o  2 (s) =  lims_*i z (s) =  0.
Proposition 3 tells us that the presence of a rival firm in market m c may induce each 
firm to inefficiently inflate the quality offered to low types (figure 3-7). This is the case 
whenever z is sufficiently small, implying that the distribution of consumer’s types is 
sufficiently narrow (and accordingly the degree of substitutability between the varieties 
sold by the two firms is sufficiently high). The rationale for this result stems from the 
fact that, by increasing Ui (1 — z) or qi (k) for k < ki, any principal i = I, r is able to
increase the range of types he attracts in market rac from k{, 1 to h -  e, 1 , for some
e > 0. The density of the additional mass of types that the principal attracts is equal
to and is therefore inversely related to z. Thus, in our model, the strength of the
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M onopoly quality schedule 
Efficient quality schedule
Equilibrium quality schedulei i
1-z 1
Figure 3-7: A possible equilibrium schedule when 2  <  z(s).
“market share” effect is directly proportional to the degree of homogeneity in consumer 
preferences. Recall from the earlier discussion th a t if the principal finds it optimal to 
set Ui (1 — z) >  0, this necessarily implies tha t the optimal quality schedule features 
overprovision for sufficiently low types. Thus, overprovision may not occur for any type 
if and only if itj (1 — z) =  0 at equilibrium. The argument then consists in showing that, 
when 2  is sufficiently low, in any equilibrium where Ui (1 — z) =  0 and overprovision 
does not occur for any type, the agent’s reservation utility would be sufficiently low to 
give firm j  an incentive to set Uj (1 — z) >  016. Clearly, this cannot be the case in any 
symmetric equilibrium. We conclude that when z is sufficiently low overprovision must 
necessarily occur for some types.
An im portant implication of proposition 3 concerns the welfare properties of different 
competitive environments. In particular, it tells us tha t in this environment the rela­
tionship between “toughness of competition” and welfare is not necessarily monotonic.
16 Notice that the cost of increasing u( 1 — z) (in terms of the rents that are offered to the agent in 
order to maintain incentive compatibility) is independent of 2 , while the benefit of increasing u (l — z) 
(the market share effect) is inversely related to z.
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Figure 3-8: Level of z below which overprovision undoubtedly occurs.
Although efficiency emerges under perfect competition, this does not necessarily imply 
that environments where competition is stronger are characterized by higher welfare 
than environments where competition is weaker17. Indeed, a stronger competitive envi­
ronment may result in inefficiently high quality being offered to some types. A thorough 
characterization of the welfare properties of a given competitive environment should 
therefore explicitly weight this possible efficiency loss against the gain which may arise 
from a reduced downward distortion of the quality offered to other types.
Finally, notice that the “threshold” level of z below which overprovision undoubtedly 
occurs is concave in s, the relative size of the local market (figure 3-8).
For s —► 0 and s —> 1, overprovision cannot be proven to occur for any z. When s is 
very low, the “market-share” effect is very strong, but we cannot rule out the possibility 
that both firms only trade with types at or above their marginal type. Conversely, when 
s is very high, any symmetric equilibrium exhibits pooling, but the “market-share” effect 
is not very strong. Thus, overprovision is more easily derived for intermediate values.
17This is however the case in other types of environments; for instance, in the standard Cournot 
setting, as the number of frims competing in the market grows infinitely large, the market price tends 
to the perfectly competitive price.
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3.4 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature that studies nonlinear pricing within a duopoly 
setting in which products are spatially differentiated (a la Hotelling). Its novelty con­
sists in combining two empirically sound features (namely the presence of two types 
of markets and the assumption that intra-brand price elasticity of demand should be 
higher for lower quality goods) and showing that these have important implications for 
the relationship between “toughness of competition” and welfare. In particular, we find 
that a strongly competitive environment will induce firms to inefficiently inflate the 
quality levels that they are offering to sufficiently low types. Thus, although perfect 
competition results in efficient quality allocations, stronger competition may not neces­
sarily result in higher efficiency. This suggests that the relationship between “toughness 
of competition” and welfare may not be monotonic.
3.5 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1:
The proof is standard and will be omitted.■
Proof of corollary 1:
A situation where Ui (.) experiences a downward jump would violate condition IC.II. 
Now consider a situation where i4j (.) experiences an upward jump. Denote the type 
at which the jump occurs as fcJ , and the size of the jump as A > 0. Consider type 
kJ — e. If this type declares to be type kJ -I- a, he obtains utility
(kJ — a) q (kJ +  a) — p (kJ +  e) —► =  u (kJ +  a) +  q (kJ +  e) {{kJ — a) — (kJ +  e)) 
—► =  it (kJ +  e) — 2eq (k J +  e ). As a —> 0, this converges to u (kJ — e) +  A —> > 
14 (kJ — a). We therefore conclude that an upward jump would also violate incentive 
compatibility. ■
Proof o f lemma 2:
In text.H
Proof o f lemma 3:
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First, notice that in any symmetric equilibrium where market m c is fully covered, 
each firm’s marginal type is given by 1 — while in any symmetric equilibrium where 
market m c is not fully covered, each firm’s marginal type is above 1 — | . We now 
prove that this second scenario can never emerge; assume that firm j ’s marginal type 
is kj > 1 — j .  From firm i's point of view, this implies that Bi (ki) =  0 for all
k i>  2 — z — kj (3.6)
Consider a type ki < 2—z — kj (implying that B(ki) =  0) . From incentive compatibility, 
we know that „ ( * )  =  „ ( * ) + 1 , (x) dx for all fc, > %. Also, because B, (fe) =  0 for
h
ki > ki, we know that, conditional on engaging in surplus-creating (i.e. trade involving 
a strictly positive quality) with type ki, the mass of types above ki with whom the 
principal contracts is given by , and the measure of consumers of type ki with 
whom the principal trades is given by The optimal WSC quality allocation to ki is 
therefore given by
k i - q i  = l -  ki (3.7)
i.e.
qi = 1 -  2ki (3.8)
This implies that a mechanism where the principal trades18 with the agent whenever his 
type is above max 2 — z — k^j —► smaller than 1 — |  19, offering qi (ki) =  1 — 2 ki, is 
superior to the mechanism where the principal only trades with types > ki —> > 1  — | . 
Thus, any equilibrium where market m c is not fully covered is necessarily dominated. 
This establishes that in any equilibrium market m c must fully covered.■
Proof o f proposition 1:
18 We refer to surplus-creating trade.
19 This is because we are restricting attention to the case where z  <  1.
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The optimal WSC mechanism solves:
max
t t i ( l - z ) , 9 i ( f c )
1 / K >J  < Mi  I Ui ( 1  -  z) +  J  qi (x ) dx, k 
1 — 2  \  1 - 2  /
k Qi (k ) -  M -  (fc) qi (k)  ^dk 
(P")
where (k ) =  J  Mi (Ui (k) , k) indicates the mass of types above k with whom the
k
principal contracts.
The first order condition with respect to qi (k) is20
Mi (ui ( k ) , k ) ( k - qi) - 0 i (k)+ J  - “*(*)).
efficiency/ informational rents trade-off k
dx
market share effect
(3.9)
Denote as ki firm z’s marginal type beforehand, and as k[ firm i’s marginal type after 
the (marginal) movement in qi (k ). For k < k .^
Ml (ui (x) , x) x^ j r ris =  - — — for k € k[, ki\ and is =  0  otherwise dqi(k) z L * J
For k > ki\
Ml (Ui (x) , x) is =  0dqi (k )
The market share effect of a marginal increase in qi (k) is therefore given by:
Ki
for k < kf. J  (xqi (z) —  it* (x)j ^~^dx
• for k > h:  0
Notice that for very small movements in qi (fc), J  (xqi (x) —  Ui (x)^j • ~ i
(3.10)
SJ-dx can
ki
20See Rochet and Stole (2002), p.309.
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be approximated by
~ \ 2
kiQi
Also notice that Mi (ui (k ), k) is equal to
1 S i (3.11)
for k < ki\ J 
for k > kf. -
(3.12)
and 3>j (k) is given by
• for k < ki: \  ^ 1  -  kij +  (ki — k'j
• for k > kf. \  ( 1  — k)
  1 Sjk
(3.13)
We can therefore write the first order condition with respect to qi (k) as 
•for k < h:
increasing in k
{k _  qi) _  l - Sik-k(l-M+ [ hqi (fcij -  ^  -  B, (ki) \h ) - g- ^ L - i
independent of k
(3.14)
for k >  ki\
i C f c - * ) - 1?
increasing in k (3.15)
Within both 1 -  z,ki and k^iy 1 , the benefit of a marginal increment in quality 
increases in the agent’s type. Thus, the optimal WSC mechanism must prescribe a 
positive relationship between quality and type within those intervals. As we approach 
ki from below, however, this monotonicity breaks down, and a downward discontinuity 
appears. This is a consequence of the fact that the “extra market-share” effect is strictly 
positive for k < ki, but abruptly disappears at k =  ki, where the agent’s utility schedule 
crosses the B(k) schedule. Thus, the optimal WSC mechanism violates condition IC.II. 
This implies that at equilibrium the optimal quality schedule must include pooling over 
an interval [k±, k j ], where ki > kf > 1 — z and 1 > k\ > ki. We denote as ^  the pooling
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quality level offered by firm i to types in [&o, &i]
We denote as the pooling quality level offered by firm i to types in [/co, k{[ at 
equilibrium, and as q ^ sc  (k) the quality allocated by firm i to type k in the optimal 
WSC mechanism. We know that at an optimum, the following conditions must hold 
(see for instance Laffont and Martimort, p. 140-141):
(3.16)
and
Mi (Ui (k) , k ) [ k -  qi] -  (k) +  J
m * (ai (x) ’x)  S M  ( x5i _  I _  Bi (x)
dx > dk = 0
From above, condition (3.17) can be rewritten as
ki
/ [ ? ( * -  ft) -  |  -  Bi f a ) )  !=«*] d k +
*?
ki
(3.18)
ki
Notice that we have six equations (three equations per firm), but ten unknowns , 
namely k^, k®, kj, k^, qh qr, ki, kr, Bi ^k^j and Br . If we restrict our attention 
to the symmetric case where Si = Sj, the number of unknown falls to four (i.e. k°, fc1, 
q and B  (l — j ) 21), but the number of equations correspondingly falls to three. The 
implication is that it is not possible for us to solve the system. Notice however that 
from the point of view of each firm, the B  (k ) schedule is given. Firms are therefore able 
to compute the optimal pooling quality, and the interval over which pooling optimally
occurs.
We now consider a scenario where firm i is a monopolist in both markets ra* and
LIn the symmetric case, the marginal type is 1 — § for both types.
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m c. When contracting with firm z, the agent has zero reservation utility, and his type 
is uniformly distributed with density K  Under such circumstances, the first order 
condition with respect to qi (k ) is
I (*-,)- Iz* (3.19)
z z
the same as (3.15). Thus, the quality level offered to types > kj in a monopoly is 
the same as what is offered in the duopoly. Now consider types < kf] by comparing 
expressions (3.15) and (3.14) it is easy to see that for those types the quality level offered 
in the duopoly is higher than what they would be offered if firm z was a monopoly. 
Finally, consider types in [kf,kj]. From above, we know that ^  =  qj^sc  (kj) =  
qf1 (kj), where q/1 (kj) denotes the quality level that type kj would be offered in a 
monopoly. From condition (3.15): q ( k )  is equal to 2k — 1 and is therefore increasing 
in k. It follows that 7^  must necessarily be > qf1 (k) for all types in [k^, kj [.
Proof o f proposition 2:
From proposition 2, we know that at equilibrium market m c is fully covered. It must 
therefore be the case that:
• either the lowest type with whom each firm trades is below 1 — |  or
• the lowest type with whom each firm trades is equal to 1 — | .
Take the second scenario. From the point of view of, say, firm z, this implies that 
Bi(ki) =  0 for all ki > 1 — | ,  and B i(k i) > 0 for all ki < 1 — | . Consider type 
ki =  lime_+o 1 — f  — £. The first order condition with respect to qi ( l — |  — e) can be 
written as:
+  M S  = 0  (3 2 0 )
efficiency/ informational rents trade-off market share effect
where  ^ is the mass of types located above 1  — |  — e with whom the principal contracts, 
Mi ( l — |  — e) (the measure of consumers of type ki = lime_*o 1 — f  — £ contracting 
with the principal) is >  J 22 and the market share effect, is > 0. Rearranging (3.20) we
22It is equal to  ^ if it i( l — |  — e) <  Bi(  1 — § — e), and it is equal to  ^ otherwise.
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obtain
Qi
z \  t z \  ~ M S
' ( 2  ~ / =  2 _ £ _ M i(.)
(3.21)
Thus, the optimal qi (l — § — e) is > 0 whenever:
2 M i (.)
(3.22)
Inequality (3.22) always holds for \  - M S  < 0; for \  - M S  > 0, a sufficient condition 
for (3.22) to hold is that
„ I
(3.23)
i.e.
1 - 1  > 2 
2 -
l - - n - ± z > 0  
2  2 s (3.24)
Inequality (3.24) always holds for
z <
i  + i
Thus, whenever z < y^-, any symmetric strategy equilibrium is such the lowest type 
8
with whom each firm engages in trade is below 1 — | . l  
P ro o f o f p roposition  3:
Assume that z < the principal solves
max
Ui(l -z) ,qi (k)
I f K 1
J  < Mi  J Ui (1 -  z) 4- J  qi {x) dx , k
1 - 2 1 - 2
kQi M  -  ~  ui (k) -  i k )  q i  i k )  
(P")
subject to qi (k ) non-decreasing in k .
The first order condition with respect to Ui (1 — z) is
-  { [ki -  (1 -  z)] a-  + (l -  ki) i }  +  (kig ~ \  -  Ui ( k i ) )  ~  (3.25)
where q is the pooling quality level offered to an interval of types (to which ki 
belongs) in order to satisfy constraint IC.II. Because we are considering a symmetric
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equilibrium, ki = 1 — |  for both firms, and condition (3.25) can be written as
‘3!6>
The solution to the principal’s problem takes the form of an interior optimum if a 
non-negative value of U{ (1 — z) exists, which sets expression (3.26) to zero. If, on the 
other hand, expression (3.26) is negative for all feasible values of U{ ( 1  — z),  then the 
optimal Ui ( 1  — z) is equal to zero (corner solution).
The first order condition with respect to q (1 — z) is
+ (M 7)
Notice that if expression (3.26) is equal to zero, implying that the optimal Ui (1 — z) is 
an interior solution, expression (3.27) reduces to
( 1  -  z) -  q =  0 (3.28)
i.e.
q { l - z )  = l - z - ^  = q * ( l - z )  (3.29)
Thus, when the optimal Ui (1 — z) is an interior solution, the quality level allocated to 
type k = 1 — z is efficient. Now consider type k = 1 — z + e, where |  > e > 0 (implying 
that 1— |  > 1 — z + e > 1 — 2:). The first order condition with respect to q (1 — 2: +  e) is
- I ± i  + 2  +  ( ( 1 - | ) 5 - £ - „ ( 1 - f ) ) i i i . O  ( ,3 0 ,
When the optimal Ui ( 1  — z) is an interior solution, expression (3.30) reduces to
The implication is that, when the optimal U{ (1 — z) is an interior solution (and therefore 
qi ( 1  — z) =  q* ( 1  — z)), the optimal WSC mechanism prescribes overprovision for all 
(interior) types below 1 — | ,  and the overall optimal quality schedule (with pooling) 
includes overprovision for some types23. A situation where the optimal mechanism 
prescribes underprovision for all interior types is therefore inconsistent with Ui ( 1  — z) > 
0, and can only emerge when u; (1 — z) = 0 at equilibrium. We now explore this scenario, 
and show that, when z < | ,  a situation where:
• Ui ( 1  — z) = 0  and
• Qi (k) < Q* (k) for all k
cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, when 2  is sufficiently low, any equilibrium must 
necessarily include overprovision for at least some types.
As we have seen above, by marginally increasing Ui ( 1  — z), the principal incurs a loss 
of (the probability with which he captures the consumer) and obtains an expected 
gain given by
1 — S (3.32)
By symmetry, at equilibrium B  (l — =  u (l — . If u (1 — z) = 0, this must be equal
to
1 - -  A 2
J  q (k)dk  (3.33)
1—z
From IC.II, we know that q (k) <  q for k < 1 — This implies that if u ( 1  — z) = 0 we 
must have
S ( 1 - | ) < 5 ( l - | - 1  +  ^ ) = 5 |  • (3.34)
The principal’s gain of marginally increasing u (1 — z) must therefore be higher or
equal than
5 ( 1 - * ) - ? ) ^  (3-35)
2  J z
If expression (3.35) is > we conclude that u ( l  — j )  = 0  can certainly not be an
23This must be the case because at equilibrium q is equal to both qw s c  (ho) and qw s c  (k i ).
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Figure 3-9: 3 ^ 3 3  (2s +  2y/2\/—s2 +  3 — 6  ^
equilibrium. This is the case whenever
( « .  - . ) - ? )
q2\  1 — s 1 +  s
i.e.
q2 1 — s (1 — s ) ( l  — z) 1 +  5  H + g - -------- —-------------   ^ - > 0
(3.36)
(3.37)2 z z 2
The expression on the lefthandside of (3.37) reaches a maximum at q = 1 — z. Notice 
that this is equal to the optimal WSC quality allocation for type 1 — | 24, and therefore 
represents a lower bound on q.
Now consider q = q* (l — j )  =  1  — | .  When q = 1 — j ,  condition (3.37) becomes
s +  ( l - s )  (1 - z )  _  1 +  a >  0
2 ,  - V  27 ,  2 " -  {3-38)
Inequality (3.38) always holds provided that 2  < 3 ^ 3  ^2s +  2y/2y/—s2 +  3 — 6  ^(figure 
3-9).
We conclude that, whenever z < min ^2s +  2y/2y/—s2 +  3 — 6 , 1 an equilibrium
where
• u (1 — z) = 0  and
• q < q* (1 -  f )
lThis can be seen from (3.15).
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cannot exist. The optimal mechanism must therefore prescribe
• either u (1  — z) > 0  or
• u ( 1  — z) = 0  and q > q* (l — §).
In both cases, overprovision occurs for some types25.■
25 When u (1 — z)  =  0 and q >  q* ( l  — | ) ,  overprovision occurs for type k =  1 — f  and, by continuity, 
must also occur for types sufficiently close to 1 — | .
Chapter 4
Incentive Problem s in th e  
Introduction o f N ew  Technologies 
when th e A dvisor is an Interested  
Party
4.1 Introduction
Every once in a while, industries are hit by innovations that change the nature of the 
abilities, skills and knowledge which are relevant for production. In those circumstances, 
it is often the case that if the employer decides to adopt the new technology, he will also 
replace his specialist workforce/technicians with new ones, who possess more appropri­
ate competencies. This generates a conflict of interests between the employer and his 
specialist workforce. Unfortunately, specialist workers are often the only ones that can 
adequately assess the efficiency of a new technology, whereas employers can, at most, 
only aspire to an imperfect signal. Current employees, therefore, are often also experts 
in that they carry private information pertaining to the efficiency of their participation 
in the production process. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the consequences of this 
informational asymmetry for technology adoption may be rather dramatic. The case of 
DuPont versus Celanese, drawn from Foster (1986), provides a good illustration.
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In the late 1970’s, polyester emerged as a possible alternative to nylon technol­
ogy in the production of tire-cords. The market leader, DuPont, asked engineers at 
its tire-cord development centre to test the new polyester cords. The centre was run 
by engineers from the Nylon Department. They tested the product, and declared 
that it had good potential, but still needed a bit of development. After a year or so, 
when the polyester designers returned for more testing, they were told that their 
product was absolutely fantastic and superior to anything made of nylon. Unfor­
tunately, DuPont had just approved a new investment in a nylon tire-cord facility 
and would have all the necessary tire-cord capacity it needed for some time. All 
that the top management could promise the Polyester Department was that when 
the nylon capacity was used up, DuPont would invest funds in polyester tire-cord.
In spite of the fact that polyester was four times more efficient than nylon in de­
livering technical innovation, DuPont stuck to nylon for a few more years. The net 
result was that it lost its dominant position in the market; in five years, Celanese (a 
relatively small new entrant) managed to capture over 75 percent of the tire-cord 
market.
Indeed, the notion that established firms tend to have difficulties in adjusting to 
competence-destroying technologies (those that alter the skills and knowledge required 
for production), in spite of having a leading role in the introduction of competence- 
enhancing technologies (those that do not render the skills required to master older 
technologies obsolete), is well documented within the management literature. In a study 
of the cement, minicomputer and airline industries, Anderson and Tushman (1986) 
show that competence-enhancing technological discontinuities are typically initiated by 
existing firms, while competence-destroying discontinuities are initiated by new firms. 
In the case of cement, for instance, they report that :
The revolution that brought powdered coal and rotary kilns rendered almost ob­
solete the know-how required to operate wood-fired vertical kilns. A totally new 
set of competencies was required to make cement, and most vertical kilns opera­
tors went out of business. (..) On the other hand, the introduction of Edison and 
Dundee kilns extended the capability of coal-fired rotary kiln technology. Existing
cement-making techniques were not made obsolete, and the incumbent firms in the 
industry proved most able to make the necessary capital expenditures.
Similar effects were observed in the minicomputers industry after the introduction 
of integrated-circuit technology (competence-destroying) as opposed to that of semicon­
ductor memory (competence-enhancing). Further evidence in this direction is reported 
by Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) within the rigid disk drive industry, by Cooper 
and Schendel (1976) in a study of seven different industries, and by Clark and Henderson 
(1990) within the photolitographic equipment industry.
Whilst there are no pretences to provide an exhaustive explanation for this empirical 
regularity, this paper hopes to nonetheless to make a contribution by emphasizing the 
role which agency problems may play in explaining the failure of established firms. 
Indeed, the idea that “managerial inertia” can be considered a source of inefficiency has 
been informally presented by Foster (1985) and Kaplan, Murray and Henderson (2001). 
Foster, for example, argues that
Many R&D vice-presidents, having earned their titles by successfully guiding 
their companies into new technologies, are not disposed to abandon their favorites 
easily. Indeed, they often inadvertently block the investigation of new threatening 
technologies in the name of existing product lines.
In contrast to those works - which adopt a behavioral approach, claiming that- cul­
tural barriers, and the tendency to stick to existing mental models, may be at the 
root of the issue - this paper emphasizes the role played by the conflict of interests 
existing between employers and employees with respect to the adoption of competence- 
destroying new technologies. We investigate whether this conflict is irreconcilable, or 
whether it can be reconciled by means of an appropriate contractual agreement. We 
address this question within the context of a principal-agent model, where the agent 
is a specialist employee with access to private knowledge concerning the profitability 
of new technology, and the principal owns the resources which are necessary for pro­
duction. Importantly, the model differs from the standard adverse selection setting, in 
that the agent’s private information concerns his relative, rather than his absolute, pro­
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ductivity; conditional on working for the principal, different types1 of agent obtain the 
same utility from any given production-payment contact. The only difference among 
different types of agent concerns their expected utility from alternative employment (or 
job-market prospects). This implies that the principal is unable to utilize appropriate 
production-payment contracts in order to discriminate among agent types.
We show that if
• the agent’s expected utility from alternative employment is lower when the new 
technology is superior to the old one and
• the principal cannot commit to employing the agent if the new technology is 
adopted
no renegotiation-proof contract exists that induces the agent to reveal his informa­
tion to the principal. The implication is that the principal chooses to adopt the least 
efficient technology with a positive probability. Thus, when it comes to the efficient 
adoption of radical new technologies, larger firms, where ownership and expertise tend 
to be separated, are disadvantaged in comparison to smaller, entrepreneurial firms.
The rationale for the result stems from the fact that any renegotiation-proof con­
tract between the agent and the principal cannot tie the agent’s compensation to the 
performance of the adopted technology, but can only take the form of a fixed payment, 
which is contingent upon the agent’s employment status. This is because once the tech­
nology choice has been operated, surplus maximization is achieved only if the principal 
is the profits’ residual claimant. Unfortunately, this implies that truthtelling cannot be 
implemented: any wage which is sufficiently high to make the agent forego his outside 
option2 when the new technology is inefficient, will necessarily him to declare that the 
old technology superior (even when it isn’t). This is because, in doing so, the agent can 
ensure that his current job is retained. Oppositely, any redundancy payment sufficiently 
high to compensate the agent for losing his employment will induce him to declare that 
the new technology superior (even when this isn’t). This is because, in doing so, the 
agent can ensure his own redundancy, thereby entitling him to a high redundancy pay­
ment. The result is therefore reminiscent of Holmstrom (1982): the budget-balancing
d efin ed  as embodying any private information that is relevant to his decision making.
2Arising form alternative employment.
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constraint makes it impossible to provide the right incentives to both the principal and 
the agent simultaneously.
This paper also characterizes the decision rule that the principal obeys when he 
cannot rely on the agent’s expertise. We show that if prior beliefs are against the new 
technology (as it is often the case), technological stagnation and excessive conservatism 
may emerge.
Finally, this paper studies the special case where the agent can undertake some 
action, which ex-ante ensures that his information will be ex-post available to the prin­
cipal. That is, the agent can ensure that his investigation into the efficiency of the new 
technology is conducted in a transparent manner. This may for instance be done by al­
lowing neutral and incorruptible third parties to scrutinize any evidence which supports 
the agent’s statement3. Crucially, it is assumed that transparency is verifiable, but can­
not be contracted upon. We find that commitment to transparency always results at 
equilibrium if, conditional on it not taking place, the principal follows a fixed rule of 
technology adoption. This happens, for instance, when the principal has no access to 
external sources of information, or if the expected profitability of the new technology is 
very high/ low. On the other hand, if the principal conditions his choice of technology 
on the realization of a given signal, then commitment to transparency may fail to occur, 
and the inefficient technology is adopted with a positive probability.
4.1 .1  R e la ted  literature
The literature on expertise (see for instance Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990), Prendergast and Stole (1996), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Otta- 
viani and Sorensen (2003)) is mainly concerned with models of cheap talk, where the 
consonance between the principal’s and the advisor’s interests is exogenously given. In 
the present paper, on the other hand, we allow this consonance to be endogenously 
determined by means of a contractual agreement between the two parties. Our primary
3 The underlying assumption is that it may be possible for third parties to verify the veracity of the 
agent’s statement. This may true even in cases where the third party could not independently verify the 
matter. Whenever a scientific article is submitted for publication in an academic journal, for istance, 
the journal referees are able to judge the validity of the article. This does not however imply that they 
could have easily written the article themselves.
91
concern is to assess whether a contract exists, which could eliminate any conflict of 
interests.
To our knowledge, the only paper that formalizes the idea that agency problems may 
cause inefficiencies in the adoption of innovations within a complete contract frame­
work is that by Dearden, Ickes and Samuelson (1990). The nature of the dilemma 
under study, however, is very different to that considered in the present setting. In 
Dearden, Ickes and Samuelson, innovations are productivity-enhancing (rather than 
competence-destroying) and the agent’s effort and innovation adoption are assumed to 
be unobservable by the principal. Furthermore, the agent’s private information concerns 
the job’s productivity. This is in contrast with the present model, where informational 
asymmetries concern the relative efficiency of the agent’s participation in the production 
process, and technology adoption is determined by the principal.
4.2 T he model
Players
There are two players in the game, the principal P and the agent A. The agent pos­
sesses skills and expertise, while the principal owns resources and means of production. 
We assume that the principal as a monopolist seller within a given market.
Technology
A technology is defined as a research path/trajectory. There are two freely available 
technologies: the old and the new one. The principal has to chose between these two 
technologies (he cannot chose both). The old technology is man operated, while the 
new technology is entirely computerized4. The agent is the only person in the world 
who is able to handle the old technology5. For simplicity, we model handling the old 
technology as a (perfectly observable and verifiable) zero-one activity, and assume that 
the agent can perform this activity without incurring any personal cost.
4 This ensures that there is no other worker to compete with the agent. Alternatively, we could 
assume that such a worker exists, but he is not informed about the state of the world.
5 This assumption is designed to capture the idea that the principal and the agent may have been 
interacting in the past, and may have undergone some relationship-specific investments.
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States o f the world
There are two states of the world:
• state O : the old technology is more efficient;
• state N : the new technology is more efficient.
At the beginning of the game, nature draws the state of the world; we denote as q 
the probability that the state is JV, and by 1 — q the probability that the state is O, 
where q G ]0,1[ . The value of q is common knowledge.
Productivity
Technology succeeds in delivering a good according to a probability distribution 
which depends upon the technology’s productivity and on the amount of resources 
invested in the technology. The probability with which the good is delivered is a function 
of the chosen technology a G {iV, O}, the true state of the world uj G {iV, 0 }  and the
realization of the principal’s choice of capital stock as k G Generally, it will be
the case that k will be different according to the principal’s choice of technology. We 
make a distinction between the old and the new technology as follows: under the old 
technology, the probability of success depends on fc in a manner that is unaffected by 
the state of the world. In other words, if the firm stays with the old technology, there is 
some positive chance of success zog(k), irrespective of the state of the world. That is:
for both u  =  N  and u  = O.
Under the new technology, on the other hand, the probability of success depends on 
A; in a manner that is different under state N  as opposed to state O. That is:
where g(.) is a strictly increasing concave function with <7(0 ) =  0 , g'(0) —* + 0 0  , 
2 1 , zq are two finite positive constants, with z \ > zq and both z \ and zq are common
P r(success \ u), a =  O, K  = k) = zog(k) (4.1)
Pr(success | u  = N, a = N ,K  = k) =  z\g{k) 
Pr(success \ u  =  O, a =  N ,K  = k) =  0
(4.2)
(4.3)
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knowledge. Thus, the new technology is risky, but also potentially more efficient than 
the old one.
Information structure
i. Agent’s information
We assume that the agent always costlessly receives a private signal which reveals 
the state of the world. Prior to receiving the signal, the agent can take a costless action 
that ensures that the principal will observe the agent’s signal (transparency). Crucially, 
we assume that transparency is observable but not verifiable, and can therefore not be 
contracted upon.
ii. Principal’s information
We assume that the principal can costlessly receive a public signal s G {O, N }  about 
the true state of the world. This signal is received at the same time as the agent’s signal. 
If u) = N  the principal’s signal is
s — N  with probability p
s — O with probability 1 — p
where p G [^, l ] . If cu = O the principal’s signal is
s = O with probability r
s = N  with probability 1 — r
where r G [J, l] .
The variables p and r express the reliability of the principal’s signal in either state 
of the world. Consider p > r\ in that case, the signal is more accurate when the state 
of the world is N  than when the state of the world is O. In other words, it is easier to 
show that the new technology is superior to the old one than it is to show the opposite. 
Notice that if p =  1 the principal’s signal is perfectly informative when s = O. The case 
where r > p depicts the opposite situation. The case where r = p describes a scenario
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where the signal is equally reliable in either state of the world. We assume that r and 
p cannot be simultaneously equal to either l 6 or 1 / 2 7.
From above:
Pr(s =  N) = pq +  (1 — r)( l  — q) (4.4)
and
Pr(s =  O) =  1 — Pr(s =  N) = r ( l  — q) +  q( 1 — p) (4.5)
Applying Bayes’ rule we derive:
J #  =  Pr(w = N \ s  = N ) =  qP  r (4.6)pq+  ( 1  -  r ) ( l  -  q)
P $  = Pr(w =  O | s =  N) = (4.7)
N P 9 + ( l  ~ r ) ( l ~ q )
P §  S  Pr(W = 0 \ s  = 0 )  = r{1_ {1q)~+% _ p) (4-8)
P g  = Pr(U = N \ s  = 0 )  = r { -_ ^  _  p) (4.9)
T im in g /s tru c tu re  of th e  gam e
The timing of the game is as follows:
1 . the state of nature is realized;
2 . the principal and the agent sign a contract;
3. the agent commits/doesn’t commit to transparency;
4. the agent and the principal receive their signals;
5. if he has not committed to transparency, the agent advises the principal;
6 . the principal decides which technology he would like to adopt. If this is the old
technology, he asks the agent to get actively involved in production;
If this was the case, the principal’s signal would be perfeclty informative.
7If this was the case, the principal’s signal would be entirely uninformative.
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/
7 . if the principal has made a proposal at date 6 , the agent either accepts or rejects 
the offer;
8 . the principal decides which technology to adopt and the amount of resources to 
be invested in it;
9. the chosen technology is operated and the good is /  is not produced; payoffs are 
realized8.
A strategy for the agent therefore consists of a decision t G {yes, no} to commit to 
transparency at time 2 and of a declaration d G {O, N}  9 to be made at time 5.
The principal’s strategy consists of a contract offered at time 2, of a decision c G 
{yes, no} to consult his signal, of a choice a G {O, N }  on which technology to adopt 
and of an amount k > 0  of resources to invest in the chosen technology.
Principal’s payoff
The principal’s valuation of the good is given by V, where V  is assumed to be finite 
and strictly positive. If the good is not delivered the principal’s payoff is zero. Recall 
that we introduced above the idea that the probability of success in delivering the good 
under either technology depends on the level of the level of capital investment k. When 
the principal devotes an amount k of resources to technology a, his expected payoff 
(without including the agent’s payment) is therefore given by
P r(success \ u;, a, k)V — k
From above, this is equal to zg{k)V — k, where 
zq if the old technology is selected;
z\ if the new technology is selected and the state of the world is N;
0  if the new technology is selected and the state of the world is O.
8 We are assuming that the true state of the world never becomes common knowledge. This is 
unlikely to be the case in reality. Relaxing this assumption implies that the principal may offer a 
contract which is conditional on the realized state of the world. Allowing for such contract should 
however not fundamentally alter the results obtained in the paper. The reason for this is that often 
the amount of time that lapses before the profitability of the new technology becomes observable is 
very long. This, coupled with the fact that the agent has limited liability makes it unlikely that such 
contract would have a large impact the agent’s incentives .
9 Allowing the agent to make no declaration does not change the results.
(4.10)
If z is known to be =  z > 0, the optimal amount of resources k*(z) to be allocated 
to the old technology is implicitly defined by g'(k*(z)) = 1/zV.
We introduce the following notation:
7i*0 =  zo g(k*(z0))V -  k*(z0), ir*N = zig(k*(zi))V -  k*(z{).
In order to ensure that zg(k*(z)) < 1 for both z = zq and z = zi, we assume that 
A ssum ption  1  g(k* (*0 ) < k
Notice that
zg(k*(z))V -  k*(z) > 0 
for all z > O10. Also, zg(k*(z))V — k*(z) is increasing in zn .This implies that
* » > < >  (4 -n )
Thus, when the state of the world is N , it is efficient for the principal to adopt the new 
technology.
A g en t’s payoff
Because we have assumed that the agent can costlessly operate the old technology, 
the agent’s payoff if he receives a monetary payment r  is simply given by t , indepen­
dently of his employment status.
A gen t’s ou tside  options
We introduce the idea that the old and the new technology are used not only in the 
monopoly market under discussion, but also in other markets (in which the principal 
does not compete). There is therefore an outside labour market in which the agent 
can find alternative employment. This alternative employment represents the agent’s
10 This can be seen from the fact that the inequality can be written as
9 {k*{z)) >  k* (z)g (k* (z))
Because we are assuming that g(.) is strictly concave, with g(0) =  0, this is always the case.
11 If we totally differentiate zg(k*{z) )V — k*(z)  with respect to z  we get: g(k*(z))V.
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(non-negative) outside option when interacting with the principal. We allow the agent’s 
outside option to differ in different states of the world. Denoting the agent’s outside 
option in state i, i = N ,0 ,  as Bi, we assume that
A ssum ption 2 ttq >  B o
This ensures that, when uj = O, it is optimal for the principal to select the old 
technology (and employ the agent). It is worth noting that the case in which the prin­
cipal does not invest in either technology cannot arise here, as he can always guarantee 
a strictly positive expected profit by adopting the old technology, and invest k*(zo) 
resources in it.
Contracts
We model the principal as having all the bargaining power in the relationship. At 
the beginning of the game, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent.
The agent’s involvement/lack of involvement in the productive activity is observable 
and verifiable. In order for the agent to be actively involved in running the chosen 
technology both the agent and the principal need to agree. We assume that the court 
cannot penalize either party for failing to agree12. Thus, the agent can ex-post refuse 
to be actively employed by the principal. Similarly, the principal cannot commit to 
employ the agent unless he strictly needs him, which is the case only if he decides to 
adopt the old technology.
For simplicity, we assume that advice which the agent may give to the principal 
concerning the technology he should adopt is observable but not verifiable. Relaxing 
this assumption does not modify the results13.
It follows that the contract between the agent and the principal takes a very simple 
form, and specifies:
12 This comes from the fact that courts are unable to distinguish between situations in which the 
employee is laid-off and situations in which he quits the job. Because employment is on at will basis 
(the contrary would correspond to slavery), this implies that either party can terminate the relationship 
without any penalty.
13 What matters is that the agent’s knowledge of the true state of the world should not be verifiable.
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■ a payment scheme in case the agent is actively employed by the principal and
• a payment scheme in case the agent is not actively employed by the principal.
We assume that the amount of resources which the principal invests in any given 
technology is not verifiable/contractible upon. This captures the idea that resources 
are often not easily measurable. Also, we concentrate on contracts which are immune 
to Pareto-improving renegotiation. As shown in the appendix, this in implies that 
implementable payment schemes necessarily take the form of fixed payments: once the 
choice of technology has occurred, joint surplus is always maximized if the principal is 
the sole residual claimant.
A contract between the agent and the principal is therefore described by a couple 
(w,wne), where w denotes the fixed payment which the agent receives for operating the 
old technology if he is actively employed by the principal, and wne denotes the fixed 
payment which the agent receives if he does not actively work for the principal14. We 
can think of in as the agent’s wage, and of wne as his redundancy payment. As shown in 
the appendix, renegotiation-proofness requires the optimal contract to include w > B o • 
This implies that in any equilibrium the agent always accepts the principal’s proposal 
to be actively employed. Without loss of generality we can therefore eliminate stages 6  
and 7 from the game.
Finally, we assume that the agent possesses no personal wealth. Thus, both wne and 
w > 0. Because signing the contract does not commit the agent to interact with the 
principal, and wne > 0 , there is no loss of generality in assuming that the agent always 
accepts to sign the contract offered by the principal.
4.3 Im plications
4.3 .1  N o  com m itm en t to  transparency
We start off by concentrating on the subgame in which the agent has not committed 
to transparency, investigating the existence of a pure-strategy, separating equilibrium
14The subscript ne stands for “not employed” .
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of the revelation game between the agent and the principal. That is, we verify whether 
an equilibrium exists, in which at date 5 the agent’s advise when u  = O differs from 
his advise when u) = N. Without loss of generality, we consider the situation in which 
d(0) = O and d(N) =  N. In that case, the principal’s optimal adoption strategy is 
given by a (0 ) =  O and a(N ) =  N.
Truthtelling by the agent in state N  requires:
wne + BN > w (4-12)
payoff when truthtelling payoff when cheating
The expression on the lefthandside of (4.12) includes Bn , the agent’s outside option 
in state N,  because we are assuming the if the agent declares the state of the world
to be N,  he will not be actively employed by the principal, and will therefore look for
alternative employment.
Truthtelling in state O requires:
U) > Wne +  Bo  (4-13)payoff when truthtelling payoff when cheating
where Bo  appears on the righthandside of (4.13) for the reasons discussed above. 
Notice that condition (4.13) is also the agent’s participation constraint, whenever the 
state of the world is O. This equivalence arises because in a truthtelling equilibrium, if 
the agent declares the state of the world to be N,  the principal will not find it optimal 
to actively employ him.
For conditions (4.12) and (4.13) to be simultaneously satisfied, we need15
B n  > B0 (4.14)
If B n  >  Bo, the principal can induce truthtelling by setting wne =  0 , w = B o • 
Notice that in this case no informational rents are necessary to ensure that the principal’s
15 It should be noted that the necessaity of inequality (4.14) for truthtelling does not depend on the 
absence of moral hazard in this setting. Even if moral hazard was present, any renegotiation-proof 
contract would prescribe that the agent receives a fixed payment if the new technology is adopted (in 
which case he is not actively involved in the productive process). This would be sufficient to guarantee 
the result.
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and the agent’s interests with respect to technology adoption are aligned; if the state 
of the world is N , they both prefer the agent to work elsewhere, and vice-versa. It 
follows that the informational asymmetry between the agent and the principal has no 
consequences for the efficiency of technology adoption.
On the other hand, if inequality (4.14) does not hold, the conflict of interests between 
the principal and the agent is irreconcilable. For a given wage rate, truthtelling requires 
the redundancy payment to be both sufficiently high to compensate for the loss of 
employment in state N  and sufficiently low to guarantee that the agent wishes to remain 
employed in state O. If the agent’s prospects in the external labour market are higher in 
state O than in state N , this is not possible; any redundancy payment that is sufficiently 
high to compensate the agent for losing his employment will necessarily induce him to 
declare the new technology superior, even when it isn’t. This is because by doing so he 
can ensure that he is made redundant, and is therefore entitled to a high redundancy 
payment.
Vice-versa, for a given redundancy payment, thruthtelling requires the wage rate 
to be both sufficiently high to guarantee that the agent wishes to remain employed in 
state O and sufficiently low to ensure that he does not wish to be employed in state N. 
When Bo > B n , this is not possible; any wage rate that is sufficiently high to induce 
the agent to forego Bo  is state O will necessarily induce him to declare that the old 
technology is superior, even when it isn’t. This is because,by doing so, the agent can 
ensure that he keeps his current job.
It is worth pointing out that this result shares interesting similarities with the un­
derinvestment result arising in the hold-up problem16.
In the standard hold-up story, the agent has to undergo some initial (unobservable) 
investment before dealing with the principal (figure 4-1). This implies that ex-post, 
when the principal offers the contract/bargains with the agent, the agent’s investment 
has already been sunk. Underinvestment then arises because the principal cannot com­
mit to reward the agent ex-ante for his nonobservable investment.
Now consider our setting. In any truthtelling equilibrium, the agent makes his
16 See for instance Grout (1984).
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A makes P offers contract/
investment bargains with A
i i
"► time
t=0 t=l
Figure 4-1: Timing in the hold-up problem.
A makes P offers /doesn’t offer 
declaration employment to A
i i
—|----------------------1----------------► time
t=0 t=l
Figure 4-2: Timing in the present setting.
(noncontractible17) declaration concerning the state of the world before the principal 
decides which technology to adopt (figure 4-2). This implies that ex-post, when the 
principal takes his decision, the agent has already revealed his information. Crucially, 
we are assuming that no commitment device exists that obliges the principal to employ 
the agent if the new technology is adopted. Whenever Bo > 5/v, this implies that telling 
the truth is necessarily costly, and results in truthtelling sharing the same characteristics 
as the investment in the hold-up setting. The impossibility of a truthtelling equilibrium 
is therefore a consequence of the principal’s inability to reward the agent ex-ante for 
telling the truth, and is analogous to the underivestment result in the hold-up problem.
As mentioned earlier, the agent’s outside options derive from the presence of an out­
side labour market. That is, other principals exist, with whom the agent may interact.
17Recall that, because we are assuming that his knowledge is not verifiable, the agent’s truthtelling 
is not contractible upon.
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Inequality (4.14) may therefore be justified if we assume that
• either no relationship or a negative correlation exists between the old/new tech­
nology’s efficiency in the industry under scrutiny and in other, alternative industries 
where the agent may look for employment or
• potential employers are entirely uninformed about the true state of the world.
If, on the other hand, we allow for the notion that if the new technology proves 
superior in this industry, it will also prove superior in other industries, and if we assume 
that at least some of the agent’s potential employers have superior information about 
the state of the world, then it is natural to assume that the agent’s prospects in the 
labour market should be higher when the state of the world is O rather than N. In 
that case, inequality (4.14) does not hold, implying that no renegotiation-proof contract 
exists that induces the agent to thruthfully reveal his information to the principal. In 
that case, we have two possibilities. If commitment to transparency is not feasible, the 
principal should condition his decision on technology on his information only. Given 
that, the optimal contract prescribes wne = 0, w =  Bo- If commitment to transparency 
is feasible, on the other hand, the principal may select the optimal contract by taking 
into account the implications that this has in terms of the agent’s incentives to commit. 
We explore both cases in the following sections.
Finally, notice that our conclusions crucially rest on the assumptions that the new 
technology is competence-destroying rather than competence-enhancing, and that the 
principal cannot credibly commit to keep the agent employed if the new technology is 
adopted. Consider the case where either of these assumptions fails to hold. Then, the 
agent would remain employed also when the new technology is adopted. Denote by wjy 
the wage that the agent receives if the principal adopts the new technology, and by wo 
the wage that the agent receives if the principal decides to adopt the old technology. In 
that case, incentive compatibility requires
wo > w n  (4.15)
w n  > wo (4.16)
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and the agent’s participation constraints are
w0 > Bo  (4-17)
wn  ^  B n  (4.18)
The principal can therefore induce truthtelling (and participation) by setting wo =  
wjy =  max (Bo, B n ).
The following proposition summarizes the results obtained so far.
P ro p o sitio n  1: I f  Bo  < B n , that is, the agent’s expected utility from alterna­
tive employment is either independent of the state of nature or is higher when the new 
technology is more efficient than the old one, the principal can extract the agent’s in­
formation without having to offer any informational rents. I f  Bo > B n , on the other
hand, a conflict of interests exists between the principal and the agent, which is irrec­
oncilable. That is, no renegotiation-proof contract exists which induces the agent to 
truthfully reveal his information.
Proposition 1 implies that when commitment to transparency is not feasible, the 
availability for the principal of an external source of information can only increase 
efficiency.
In what follows we concentrate the case where Bo > B n ,  normalize B n  to zero and 
denote B o  as B.
4 .3 .2  T h e  prin cip a l’s decision
In the preceding section we have established that, when Bo > B n  the agent will never 
truthfully reveal his information. Thus, conditional on the agent not committing to 
transparency, the principal will not condition his choice of technology upon the agent’s 
declaration but will either:
• always adopt the old technology, or
• always adopt the new technology, or
• follow his signal, adopting the new technology when s =  N  and keeping the old 
technology when s = O.
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We now identify the conditions under which the principal will find it optimal to 
follow each strategy.
Conditional on s = N , if the principal adopts the new technology he will chose to 
invest an amount of resources kjy that maximizes
P tfz ig( k ) V - k  (4.19)
k$ (zi,p ,q )  (henceforth for brevity) is therefore implicitly defined by g'(fcjy) =  
l / P $ ziV . Notice that for the principal the situation is ex-ante equivalent to one in 
which he knows with certainty that the new technology has productivity P ff z\.
Conditional on s = O, if the principal adopts the new technology he will chose to 
invest an amount of resources that maximizes
P g z l9( k ) V - k  (4.20)
and is therefore implicitly defined by g'(kQ) =  1/Pq z \V  . Notice that for the principal 
the situation is ex-ante equivalent to one in which he knows with certainty that the new 
technology has productivity P q  z \ .
Because the old technology’s productivity is perfectly known, the amount of re­
sources the principal invests when he selects the old technology is equal to indepen­
dently of s. Thus, the principal’s expected profit when he selects the old technology is 
always equal to 7Tq — B.
Conditional on s = N , the principal adopts the new technology if
Pn  *19(k%) ~ k % > ir* o -B  (4.21)
and keeps the old technology otherwise.
If r  =  1: Pjy =  1 and P $  zig(k$) — fcjj =  7r]^ , implying that condition (4.21) 
is always satisfied. If r < 1, on the other hand, condition (4.21) always holds for 
q —> 1 (in which case P $  1) but never holds for q —> 0 (in which case P $  —* 0) .
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Because the lefthandside of (4.21) is strictly increasing in q18, there therefore exist a 
qL(p, r, zi, zq, B) > 0 such that condition (4.21) does not hold for q < qL and holds for
q > q L■
Conditional on s =  O, the principal keeps the old technology if
P g  z i g ( * & ) - * 8 < * * o - B  (4 .22)
and adopts the new technology otherwise19.
If p = 1: Pq = 0, implying that condition (4.22) is always satisfied. If p < 1, on the 
other hand, condition (4.22) always holds for q —> 0 (in which case Pq —> 0) but never 
holds for q —> 1 (in which case Pq —> 1). Because the lefthandside of (4.22) is strictly 
increasing in q20, there therefore exist a qH(p, r, z\, zo, B) < 1 such that condition (4.22) 
does not hold for q > qH and holds for q < qH.
Notice that qH is always higher than qL. This follows from the fact tha t21
Pn  zi9(^n ) ~  kn  > P $  z i9(^o) ~  kS  (4.23)
This brings us to the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  2: Conditional on the agent not committing to transparency, the
principal follows his own signal only when the prior probability q with which the new
technology may be superior to the old one takes an intermediate value. I f  q is suf­
ficiently low, the principal always adopts the old technology, while if q is sufficiently 
high he always adopts the new technology. That is, there exist a qL(p,r, z\, zq, B) and 
a qH(p ,r ,z i,zo ,B ) (denoted as qL and qH for brevity) such that:
' if  9 £ [qLi QH]: the principal follows his signal.
’ if  q < qL: the principal always adopts the old technology.
• i f  q > qH: the principal always adopts the new technology.
18This can be seen from the fact that a(PjVzi9^ n ) *=at) _  — g{ks) > 0 .dq  (p9+ ( i _ r ) ( x _ 9))- i _
We assume that if the principal is indifferent, ha always adopts the old technology.
20This can be seen from the fact that - iT.° Zl9^ k°  ^ k° ) _  —r{1~$— g(ko) 0-
d q  (r(i_,)+g(i_p))^  i,Kr_UJ —
We can see that by noticing that zg(h*(z)) — k*(z) is increasing in z and > Pq
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The intuition behind the result is rather straightforward. If the prior probability 
with which the new technology is superior to the old one is very low/high, the princi­
pal’s posterior beliefs on the efficiency of new technology will accordingly be low/high, 
independently of the realization of the signal. In that case, the dominant strategy for 
the principal is to follow a fixed rule of technology adoption. On the other hand, if the 
prior probability takes an intermediate value, the signal’s realization plays an important 
role in altering the principal’s posterior beliefs. Thus, the principal finds it optimal to 
condition his choice of technology adoption upon this realization. Notice that , cae- 
teris paribus, a higher z\ / zq decreases both qL and qH, making it more likely that the 
principal always adopts the new technology. Similarly, a lower z\ / zq increase both qL 
and qH, making it more likely that the principal always adopts the old technology. The 
rationale for this is that the opportunity cost of adopting the old technology when the 
state of the world is N  is an increasing function of zi / zq.
Proposition 2 implies that whenever the prior probability with which the new tech­
nology may be superior to the old one is sufficiently small and/or the efficiency gain 
which may be realized by adopting the new technology is not very large, we should ex­
pect firms to stick to old, familiar technologies. Empirical evidence shows that, in most 
industries, the statistical probability with which a superior, competence-destroying tech­
nology may emerge at any point in time is rather small. From proposition 2, this yields 
the empirical prediction that larger firms, where the agency problem may be expected 
to be more acute, should be more prone to excessive conservatism and technological 
stagnation than smaller, entrepreneurial firms.
4 .3 .3  O p tim ality  o f  com m itm en t
We now study the situation where the agent may ex-ante be able to commit to trans­
parency. We analyze the conditions under which this may happen, taking into account 
the fact that the agent’s decision is influenced by the principal’s optimal strategy.
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Interm ediate priors
We first consider the case where, if the agent does not commit to transparency, the 
principal follows his own signal , adopting the new technology if s =  TV and adopting 
the old one if s = O. From proposition 2, we know that this happens only if the 
prior probability with which the new technology is superior to the old one takes an 
intermediate value, that is, q G [gL, qH].
In this case, the agent’s ex-ante expected utility if he does not commit to trans­
parency is given by
Pr(s =  N) ( w ^  + P g B )  +  Pr(s =  O) we (4.24)
expected payoff if s=N payoff if 8=0
The agent’s ex-ante expected utility if he commits to transparency is equal to wneq +  
(1 — q)w The agent therefore decides to commit to transparency if
wneq + (1 -  q)w > Pr(s =  TV) (u>ne + P$ B) 4- Pr(s =  0 )w  (4.25)
substituting and simplifying, this yields
( w - w ne) ( ( l  - r ) ( l  - q )  - q ( l  -  p)) > B  (1 - r ) ( l  -  q) (4.26)
We distinguish between three cases:
(i) ( l - r ) ( l - q )  > q ( l - p )
In this case, condition (4.26) requires w > B  +  wne. The cheapest way for the 
principal to achieve this is by setting
wne = 0 , w =  >  B  (4.27)
(1 -  ?) -  ?ir£
The agent gets an informational rent in state O, which decreases as ( l —r ) ( l —q)—q( l—p) 
gets smaller. Notice that if p = 1, i.e. the signal s = O is perfectly informative, we 
are always in this case; the principal can induce transparency by offering no informa­
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tional rents, i.e. by setting wne =  0, w = B.  This represents the lower bound on the 
informational rents that need to be offered when (1 — r) ( l  — q) > q( 1 —p).
(ii) q ( l - p )  > ( l - r ) ( l - q )
In this case condition (4.26) requires w < wne. The cheapest way for the principal 
to induce transparency is to set
w = B , Wne =  , Bq > B  (4.28)
9 ~  (1 -  9)i=j;
Thus, the agent gets an informational rent in state JV, which gets smaller as q( 1 —p) — 
(1 — r ) ( l  — q) increases. Notice that if r =  1, i.e. the signal s = N  is perfectly 
informative, we are always in this case. The principal can induce truthtelling by setting 
w = wne = B. This represents the lower bound on the informational rents which need 
to be offered when q( 1 — p) > (1 — r)( l — q).
(iii) ( 1 - 0 ( 1 - ^ )  =  9(1 - P)
If this is the case, the agent can never be induced to commit to transparency.
We denote as q*(p, r) (henceforth q*) the value of q implicitly defined by the above 
equality:
q’(p,r) = 2 ^ r l p (4-29)
Notice that when the principal’s signal is equally reliable in either state of the world, 
that is, p = r, q* = ^ independently of the precision of the principal’s signal.
The following proposition summarizes the results so far.
Proposition 3: Whenever the principal conditions his choice of technology adoption 
in the absence of transparency upon the realization of his signal, the nature of the infor­
mational rents that have to be offered in order to induce commitment varies according 
to the value of q. When q < q*, the principal must offer a wage which is strictly higher 
than the minimum required to ensure the agent’ s participation ex-post. When q > q*, 
the principal must offer a strictly positive redundancy payment.
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Informational rents
B
*
10
Figure 4-3: Informational rents needed to induce transparency, assuming that both r 
and p are ^  1.
I f  the principal’s signal is perfectly informative in one of its realizations, i.e. if 
either p or r is equal to one, the magnitude of the informational rents needed to induce 
commitment to transparency is independent of q. I f  p = 1, i.e. the signal s = O is 
perfectly informative: transparency always occurs; if  r = 1, i.e. the signal s = N  is 
perfectly informative: transparency occurs if and only i f  (n*N — ttq) >
On the other hand, if  both p or r are different to one, the magnitude of the informa­
tional rents required to induce commitment increases as q approaches q*, and becomes 
infinitely large when q =  q*. Thus, when q = q* no contract exists which may induce 
the agent to commit to transparency.
Figure 4-3 depicts the informational rents needed to induce transparency, assuming 
that both r and p are ^  1. These rents become infinitely large as q approaches q*. In 
that case, the principal will never find it optimal to induce transparency at equilibrium. 
By continuity, this must also be the case whenever q is sufficiently close to q*. This 
brings us to the following lemma:
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Figure 4-4: Principal’s expected payoff when he follows his signal (dotted line) and 
when he induces transparency (bold line), assuming that g(k) = y /k /10, V = 20, 
z\ =  3, zo = 2, B  = 3 and p = r = 0.7
Lemma 1: Unless the principal’s signal is perfectly informative in one of its real­
ization, i.e. unless either r or p is equal to one, there exist an interval \q{p,r),q(p,r)] 
around q*{p,r) such that if q belongs to that interval, the informational rents which 
the principal should offer in order to ensure transparency are so high that the principal 
finds it optimal not to do so.
The degree to which this affects the probability of obtaining transparency at equi­
librium depends on the overlap between \q, q] and \qL, qH]. We denote the set of values 
of q such that these two intervals overlap as 17. Whenever q G Cl’: commitment never 
occurs at equilibrium. Figure 4-4 depicts the principal’s expected payoff when he follows 
his signal (dotted line) and when he induces transparency (bold line), assuming that 
g(k) = y /k /10, V = 20, z\ = 3, z$ = 2, B  =  3 and p = r = 0.7. In that case, q* = 0.5, 
qH ~  0.54, qL ~  0.18, _q ~  0.33 and q = qH. The principal therefore finds it optimal 
not to induce transparency whenever q G £1 = [0.33,0.54].
From proposition 3, we know that Q is always empty whenever p = 1. When r = 1, 
on the other hand, 17 is empty if (n*N — tvq) > and is equal to ]0,1[ otherwise.
I l l
More generally, it is easy to see that ft is always non-empty whenever
qH > q* > qL (4.30)
As the following proposition shows, this is the case whenever r and p are sufficiently 
large, and takes an intermediate value.
Proposition 4: Whenever q € ft, commitment never occurs at equilibrium. This 
is because the informational rents that are required to induce commitment are too high 
for the principal to be willing to pay them. Provided that ^  is sufficiently smaller than 
Q is surely non-empty if
Proposition 4 tells us that when the principal’s signal is sufficiently informative, and 
zi/zo is neither too large nor too small, a range of priors exist such that, whenever the 
prior probability with which the new technology may be superior to the old one belongs 
to this range, commitment does not occur at equilibrium. Notice that the conditions 
which are sufficient to guarantee that such a range exists also increase the desirability 
for the principal of consulting his signal.
D iscussion
In order to understand the intuition behind the direction and magnitude of informational 
rents it is instructive to rewrite condition (4.23) as
(■w - B -  wne)(l -  r ) ( l  - q ) >  q( 1 -  p){w -  wne) (4.31)
By committing to transparency the agent prevents the principal from making mistakes, 
i.e. from adopting the new technology in state O (mistake of type O) or adopting the 
old technology in state N  (mistake of type N ).
Consider the first type of mistake: if the principal follows his signal, this type of 
mistake happens with probability q(l — p). The difference between the utility that the 
agent obtains when a type O mistake occurs and that under transparency is (B  +  wne — 
w). Now consider the second type of mistake. The probability with which it happens is 
given by (1 — g)(l — r), while the difference in the agent’s utility from the transparency
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scenario is (w — wne).
Assume that w > wne: then the agent’s failure to commit to transparency results 
in an opportunity gain (equal to w — wne) if the principal incurs a type N  error and 
in an opportunity cost (given by w — B — wne) if the principal incurs a type O error22. 
If the probability with which type 0  error happens is higher than than with which 
type N  occurs, by setting w > wne the principal therefore increases the desirability of 
transparency.
The opposite occurs if wne > w: in that case, by failing to commit to transparency 
the agent incurs an opportunity cost (equal to wne — w) if the principal makes a type N  
mistake and an opportunity gain (given by B  4- u;ne — w) if the principal makes a type 
O mistake. Thus, if the probability with which a type N  mistake takes place is higher 
than that with which a type O takes place, by setting wne > w the principal increases 
the desirability of transparency.
The closer the ex-ante probabilities with which either type of mistake occurs, the 
higher the informational rents that the principal has to offer to induce the agent to 
commit. If these two probabilities are exactly the same, commitment cannot be induced. 
This arises from the fact that, because B  is strictly positive:
•if w > wne the agent minds type O error less than he benefits from type N:
w -  wne ~ B  < w -  wne (4-32)
cost from type O error gain from type N error
• if wne > w, the agent benefits from type O error more than he suffers from type
N:
wne — W  < B  +  W n e — W (4.33)
cost from type N error gain from type O error
Thus, if the probabilities with which the two errors take place are the same, the agent 
will always find it preferable not to commit to transparency. Notice that this will never 
be the case if either r or p is equal to one.
We now see why it is the case that the precision of the principal’s signal affects
the agent’s incentives to commit only to the extent to which p and r are sufficiently far
22 This follows from the fact that w  >  B.
113
apart. This happens because the difference between p and r affects q( l—p ) / ( l —q)( l—r), 
the ratio of the probabilities of a type 0  to a type N  error. If p = r, this ratio becomes 
entirely independent of the signal’s precision. In that case, the informational rents that 
have to be offered in order to induce transparency only depend on the players’ prior 
beliefs, summarized by the variable q. Generally, for p and r close to each other, the 
ratio of probabilities is close to q/( 1 — q).
H igh /low  priors
We now explore the situation in which, if the agent does not commit to transparency, the 
principal always adopts the new technology (q > qH). This implies that the principal 
will never employ the agent. In that case, the agent will commit to transparency 
whenever
qwne +  (1 -  q)w > W n e  +  (1 — q)B  (4.34)
i.e.
w > wne +  B  (4.35)
The above condition can be met by setting wne =  0 and w = B. Thus, informational 
rents are not necessary to induce the agent to commit to transparency. Notice that, in 
terms of the incentives which need to be provided to induce commitment, the situation 
is equivalent to that where the principal follows his own signal, and p = 1 (i.e. the 
signal s = O is perfectly informative). This is because, when p = 1, the only type of 
mistake which the principal may commit by following his own signal is a mistake of 
type N , the same as in the present case. The principal’s expected profit from inducing 
transparency is given by
W n  +  (1 “  9) fao  “  B ) (4-36)
The principal’s expected profit from adopting the new technology is on the other hand 
given by
qzig{kN)V -  kN (4.37)
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where kN = a,igmaxqzig(k)V  — k. From the definition of 7r^, this is always inferior to 
the expected profit the principal can gain by inducing commitment.
Finally, we consider the situation where if the agent does not commit to trans­
parency, the principal always utilizes the old technology (q < qL). In that case, the
agent will commit whenever
qyjne +  (i -  q)w > w (4.38)
i.e.
wne > w (4.39)
In order to induce information revelation, the principal has to offer the agent some 
informational rents when uj = N . The least costly contract to achieve transparency 
is given by w = wne =  B. Notice that, in terms of the incentives which need to be 
provided to induce commitment, the situation is equivalent to that where the principal 
follows his own signal, and r =  1 (i.e. the signal s = N  is perfectly informative). 
This is because, when r =  1, the only type of mistake which the principal may commit 
by following his own signal is a mistake of type O, the same as in the present case. 
Also, notice that the requirement that wne =  B  corresponds to the lower bound on the 
informational rents required to induce commitment when the principal follows his own 
signal, and q(l — p) > (1 — r)( l — q) (case ii).
The principal’s expected profit under commitment is given by (1—q)no+q  [tt^ v ~ B]. 
The principal will find it optimal to pay the informational rent and induce truthtelling 
whenever
(1 -  q){tv'o -  B) +  q [ir'N -  B\ > (ttJ, -  B) (4.40)
i.e.
*N > *o  (4-41)
From assumption 2 this is always the case. We conclude that if the principal does not 
condition his choice of technology on his signal the requirements necessary to ensure 
commitment are such that the principal always finds in his interest to meet them. This
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is summarized in the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  5: I f  the prior probability with which the new technology may be supe­
rior to the old one is sufficiently high/low, so that the principal’s choice of technology in 
the absence of commitment does not depend upon the realization of his signal, or if the 
principal has no access to any signal, commitment always occurs at equilibrium. This 
implies that the principal’s technology choice is always efficient
When the principal follows a fixed rule of technology adoption in the absence of 
transparency, mistakes can only be of one kind. For instance, when the principal would 
otherwise adopt the new technology, transparency prevents him from incurring in type 
O errors. Vice-versa, when the principal would otherwise adopt the old technology, 
transparency prevents him from making type N errors. In this case, commitment by 
the agent can always be induced by appropriately manipulating the contract on offer. 
This in contrast to the case where the principal follows his own signal. In that case, 
we have seen that if q = q* no contract exists which may induce commitment by the 
agent. Moreover, when the principal follows a fixed rule of adoption, the rents which 
induce commitment correspond to the lower bounds identified in the case where the 
principal follows his own signal. A situation where he has no access to external sources 
of information is thus more favorable for the principal than one where he has the option 
of consulting external advisors, who are however only imperfectly informed.
4.4 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the consequences and implications of the conflict of interests that 
exists between employers and employees in the presence of innovations that alter the set 
of skills involved in the production process. We find that, under some circumstances, 
this conflict is irreconcilable. A crucial role in deriving this result is played by the 
agent’s outside opportunities in the labor market, and by the principal’s ability (or 
lack of ability) to commit to keeping the agent employed even if the new technology is 
adopted. The implication of this result is that, when it comes to the efficient adoption 
of radical new technologies, larger firms, where ownership and expertise tend to be 
separated, are disadvantaged with respect to smaller, entrepreneurial firms. Indeed,
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our model predicts that agency problems may result in excessive conservatism, and 
reluctance with respect to change. Finally, we study the special case where it may be 
possible for the agent to ex-ante commit to transparency. We find that if the employer 
has access to an external source of information, efficiency may decrease.
4.5 Appendix
Informed potential employers
We consider the simplest possible case, in which only one perfectly informed poten­
tial employer (denoted by E) exists. We denote the value of output to E is given by V ', 
which is possibly different form V. In every other respect, E is similar to P. Assume that 
the only contract that P can write with E  is contingent on E  s declaration23. Denote 
by ti, i =  O, N  the transfer that E  receives if he declares the state of the world to be i. 
We investigate the possibility of E  truthfully revealing his information.
In any truthtelling equilibrium, if E  declares the state of the world to be N  the 
principal adopts the new technology and does not employ the agent. In that case, when 
dealing with E, the agent does not have any outside option and is therefore ready to 
accept any (positive and ) arbitrarily small payment. Thus, £ ”s expected payoff when 
the state of the world is O but he declares it to be N  is given by zog{ko)V' — ko > 0, 
where ko is implicitly defined by g'(ko) =  1 / z oV. In any truthtelling equilibrium the 
contract between P  and E  must therefore satisfy
tN > to
to  > tjsr + zog{ko)V' — ko in state O
in state N (4.42)
(4.43)
This is clearly not possible.
Renegotiation-proof payment schemes
The optimality of offering a fixed payment when the agent is actively employed 
follows form the fact that the old technology’s productivity is common knowledge and
23 Allowing for more sophisticated contracts should not change the result (to be checked).
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that the principal can perfectly monitor the agent.
We now show that any Pareto-optimal severance package takes the form of a lump 
sum payment. This can be seen as follows:
Consider the situation in which at date 6 the principal decides to adopt the new 
technology and, as a consequence, not to actively employ the agent. Assume that the 
agent’s compensation package in that case consists of a fixed payment a and an extra 
payment b conditional on the good being delivered. The principal’s total expected payoff 
is
zi9(k) [V — b] — k — a (4.44)
and the agent’s expected payoff is
a +  bzig(k) (4.45)
where k is implicitly defined by g'(k) =  \  j z \  [V — b]
Now consider the scenario in which the principal buys his residual claimant rights 
back from the agent, against a fixed payment F = bzig(k)24. In that case, the principal’s 
expected payoff is given by
zig(k*(zi))V -  k*(Zl) - a - F  (4.46)
It is easy to verify that the principal prefers this second scenario whenever
ir*N > z\g{k)V  — k (4.47)
By definition, if*N = argmax [z\g{k)V —/e], so the inequality necessarily holds. We 
conclude that a contract specifying b > 0 is not renegotiation-proof, in the sense that 
it is not immune that Pareto-improving renegotiation.
Optimal w
We now show that any optimal contract must have w > B o . If at time 2 the agent
commits to transparency, or in any thruthelling equilibrium, if the state of the world
24 Implying that the agent is as well off as before.
118
is O the principal would like to retain the agent. Thus, the optimal contract must 
necessarily specify w > Bo-
Now consider equilibria in which the agent does not commit to transparency and 
does not truthfully disclose his information at time 5. Because the principal can always 
ex-post refuse to actively employ the agent, we need only to consider the subgame in 
which the principal wishes to adopt the old technology, and makes a proposition to 
the agent at time 6. First, assume that B ^  < w < Bo  and consider a separating 
equilibrium, in which the agent does not accept the offer if u  = O and accepts it 
if u> =  N . Clearly, this is not renegotiation-proof: if the agent refuses the offer the 
principal has an incentive to renegotiate the initial contract and offer w > Bo- Now 
consider a separating equilibrium in which the agent accepts the offer when u  = O and 
refuses it otherwise. In this case, upon refusal/acceptance the principal would optimally 
stick to his initial offer, which would make the agent’s strategy suboptimal.
We are therefore left with pooling equilibria. Notice that from an ex-ante point of 
view, the pooling equilibrium in which the agent refuses the principal’s offer in both 
states of the world is always (weakly) dominated by the one in which the agent always 
accepts. Acceptance in both states of the world is however optimal for the agent only 
if w > Bo-
P roof o f proposition 3:
We only need to prove the following part: “if p = 1, i.e. the signal s = O is perfectly 
informative: transparency always occurs; if  r =  1, i.e. the signal s =  N  is perfectly 
informative: transparency occurs if and only if (n*N — ttq) > - £ ? •
Consider the case where p = 1. Then the principal can induce transparency by 
setting Wne — 0, w =  B.  His expected profit from inducing transparency is therefore 
given by
qn*N +  (1 -  q) (tr*Q -  B) (4.48)
while his expected profit from following his own signal is given by
[1 -  Pr(s =  O)) (P $ z ig(k%)V -  fc#) +  P r(s = O )« ,  -  B) (4.49)
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when p =  1, Pr(s = O) = r( 1 -  q), and Pfj = 1_rgfT.g so the above expression can be 
written as
(1 -  r  +  rg) (j  ~ r~+~ +  r ( l  -  g) (tt^  -  5 )  (4.50)
The principal induces transparency if
g?r^ +  (1 -  q) (ir*0 -  B) > qzxg(k^)V -  (1 -  r +  rq) k% +  r ( l  -  q) (tt*0 -  B) (4.51) 
i.e.
q7T*N +  (ttq - B ) (  1 -  g)(l -  r) > qz1g(kft)V  -  (1 - r  + rq) k% (4.52)
Because (1 — r  +  rq) > g, a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that
+ (*o -  B) (1 -  g ) ( l  -  r) > q (zl9(k%)V -  k%) (4.53)
From the definition of 7r)^ , this is always the case.
We now consider the case where r = 1. When r =  1, Pr(s =  O) =  1 — pq and 
P $  =  1. The principal’s expected profit if he consults his own signal is therefore given 
by
pqir*N +  (1 -  pq) (tt*0 -  B) (4.54)
Alternatively, the principal can induce truthtelling by setting w =  = B. In that
case, his expected profit is
qn*N +  (1 -  q)it*0 -  B  (4.55)
The principal therefore finds it optimal to induce commitment if and only if
qTr*N +  (1 -  q)ir*0 ~ B >  pqir*N +  (1 -  pq) (tt*0 -  B) (4.56)
This can be rewritten as
g(l -  p) (tt*n -  7r£>) > pqB (4.57)
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i.e.
Kv -  *o) > Y ~ p B
■
Proof of proposition 4
We only need to prove that “Provided that ^  is sufficiently smaller than is
surely non-empty if  .
In order to do that, we explore the conditions under which, when q = q*, the prin­
cipal optimally follows his own signal, should the agent fail to commit to transparency. 
Recall that q* =  when q = q*, therefore, Pq =  1 — r and P $  =  p.
When s = N , the principal therefore finds it optimal to adopt the new technology if
pzig{k%)V - k % > 7 T Q -  B  (4.58)
Because zg(k*(z))V — k*(z) is increasing in z, the above inequality surely holds if 
pz\ > zo, i-e. zi/zo > 1/p.
When 5 =  0 , the principal finds it optimal to adopt the old technology if
(1 -  r)zig(k%)V - k g < w * 0 - B  (4.59)
The necessary condition for this to be the case is that (1 — r)z\ < zq. Provided that 
zq — (1 — r)z\ is sufficiently large with respect to £?, this condition is also sufficient.■
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C hapter 5
C oncluding remarks
This thesis characterizes the impact of type-dependent outside options in adverse se­
lection models, within the context of three separate settings. In each instance, we find 
that the properties of the equilibrium contract are considerably altered. As suggested 
by Lewis and Sappington (1989), type-dependent outside options introduce new incen­
tives for the agent, which may countervail those arising in the standard model. Chapter 
2 identifies the conditions under which an employer can generate such countervailing 
incentives by randomizing over the probability with which the employee is retained after 
the first period of employment. It is shown that this crucially depends on the way in 
which the impact of dismissal on the agent’s employment prospects changes according to 
the agent’s ability. Although it introduces ex-post inefficiencies, randomization may also 
equip the employer with the means to discriminate more easily among different worker 
types, and may therefore be optimal whenever this screening effect is sufficiently strong. 
In that case, the presence of type-dependent outside options increases the efficiency of 
the optimal contract.
This result is unfortunaly not generalizable. Chapter 3 identifies a setting where the 
presence of a type-dependent outside option - arising from the presence of another seller 
in the market - results in the principal introducing new types of distortions with respect 
to the scenario where he is the only seller. This is because the competitive pressure 
originating from the presence of a rival firm induces the principal to raise the quality of 
the goods offered to some types above its efficient level. The implication is that more
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competition may not necessarily be desirable.
Finally, chapter 4 studies a situation where the presence of type-dependent outside 
options may create a conflict of interests between the principal and the agent. The 
central question is then whether a contract between the two parties exists, which would 
re-align their interests. We find that this is never true within a reasonable class of 
contracts, implying that the equilibrium outcome may be inefficient with a positive 
probability. In that case, the presence of type-dependent outside options unambiguously 
decreases total welfare.
Together, these chapters confirm that, in the presence of type-dependent outside 
options, no general predictions can be made concerning the welfare properties of the 
equilibrium contract. Moreover, the equilibrium outcome is heavily affected by the 
properties of the agent’s outside option - whether it increases or decreases with the 
agent’s type, the steepness with which it does so, and so on. This suggests that a return 
to richer settings, where several parties simultaneously interact with each other, may 
be the only way to achieve sharper predictions.
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